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RESOLVING LEGAL CLAIMS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA:
APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW WHERE
DIPLOMACY ALONE FALLS SHORT*
Joyce Rodriguez, Esq.**
INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the nearly sixty-year-old conflict between the
United States and the Republic of Cuba lies the $1.9 billion U.S. claim
against Cuba for the mass expropriation of American-owned property
and assets in Cuba during the early years of the Cuban revolution. 1
socialist revolution and uncompensated expropriation of U.S.

*

Please note that this article was written without direct knowledge of
the content of the current bi-lateral negotiations between the American and
Cuban delegates. The insights and other recommendations in this article arise
from publicly available information, including statements made through media
outlets, published works of experts and scholars, as well as my own personal
experience as a Cuban-American born to Cuban political exiles.
**
Joyce Rodriguez, Esquire obtained her J.D. from the Levin School
of Law, University of Florida and L.L.M. in International Law from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Ms. Rodriguez
would like to thank her LL.M. capstone advisor, distinguished Professor
Jeswald W. Salacuse, for his exceptional insight and guidance throughout the
writing process.
1
U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN C LAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM N OF
THE U.S., S ECTION II COMPLETION OF THE C UBAN C LAIMS PROGRAM UNDER
TITLE V OF THE INTERNATIONAL C LAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1949, 69 (1972)
[hereinafter FCSC CUBAN REPORT]; U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE U.S., Completed Programs Cuba (Dec. 5,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba [hereinafter U.S.
DEP T OF JUSTICE].
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property initiated a series of events that have defined the decades-old
stalemate between the countries. The passage of time, however, has
inevitably witnessed incremental but definitive changes to U.S.-Cuba
relations. Many of these changes have come to fruition in the past ten
diplomatic relations with Cuba and the subsequent loosening of U.S.
economic sanctions against Cuba.2
Although the Obama
argue that these policy changes, along with the application of
international law and the use of arbitration, may be strategically
utilized to induce the Cuban government to settle the expropriated
property claims.
However, it would be unrealistic to assume that the U.S. will be
able to resolve its legal claims against Cuba without also addressing
shifts its negotiation
strategy with Cuba towards resolving its expropriated-property claims
against Cuba, Cuba will raise its own counterclaims against the U.S.
arising from the embargo and alleged U.S. covert operations against
Cuba.3 This in turn will trigger the U.S. to respond in kind and raise
its claims against Cuba for its alleged covert operations against the
U.S. and its nationals.4 Accordingly, this paper will address the

2

See President Barrack Obama, Statement by the President on Cuba
Policy
Changes
(Dec.
17,
2014),
available
at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/
statement-president-cuba-policy-changes. Most of these changes have
Adam
Fisher,
place,
ABC News (Jun. 17, 2017, 4:09 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
trumps-cuba-policy/story?id=48058622.
3
See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/46/193
(Aug. 19, 1991).
4
See, e.g., Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253
54 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (arising from Cuban Government directing Air Force to
shoot down two unarmed civilian airplanes over international waters on
February 24, 1996, where district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and
awarded them compensatory damages of $49,927,911 against the Cuban
Government and Cuban Air Force, as well as punitive damages of
$137,700,000 against the Cuban Air Force alone).
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resolution of the U.S. expropriated-property claims against Cuba as
well as other potential legal claims each country will likely raise
against the other in their diplomatic negotiations.
This paper will argue that international law and precedent provide
the U.S. and Cuba with valuable tools, as well as a legitimate and fair
framework to resolve many of their legal claims against each other.
The first section will explore the changing relationship between the
U.S. and Cuba, outline internal changes in each country, and argue that
the time is ripe for resolution of their legal claims. The next section
will examine the measures taken by Cuba to nationalize U.S. property,
review the measures taken by the U.S. to enforce the embargo against
Cuba, and show that the validity of the measures can be fairly
evaluated by applying international law principles. The third section
will examine how the U.S. and Cuba have resolved similar claims in
the past. The paper will then analyze two of the most comprehensive
and creative scholarly proposals for the settlement of the U.S. claims
against Cuba to point out their advantages and disadvantages. Finally,
the paper will conclude by providing a new forward-looking proposal
for the resolution of outstanding legal claims between the U.S. and
Cuba that accounts for current political and economic realities.

I.
THE TIME IS RIPE FOR RESOLUTION
OF THE LEGAL CLAIMS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND CUBA
The hostile U.S.-Cuba relationship is rooted in the Cold War. On
January 8, 1959, Fidel Castro and the 26th of July Movement entered
Havana and
revolutionary forces took power in Cuba.5 From
1959 1963, Castro directed the expropriation of nearly all private

5

See ESTABAN MORALES DOMINGUEZ & GARY PROVOST, UNITED
STATES CUBAN R ELATIONS: A CRITICAL H ISTORY 38 (2008).

SOUTH C AROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL L AW AND BUSINESS

146

VOL. 14.2

property on the island. 6 These measures are discussed more
thoroughly in the next section. However, it is important to note that
despite the illusory nature of the compensation schemes set forth in
ultimate failure to pay
any compensation for the exporpriations, the Cuban government did
attempt to negotiate settlement options with the U.S. government as
early as September and December 1959. 7
early indication that the new Cuban government was willing to
negotiate was rebuffed by the U.S. 8 The U.S. corporations that did
engage in settlement discussions with the Cuban government were
unable to come to an agreement for fear of losing their future property
claims if the Castro government was eventually removed from power.9
Thus, the futility of settling the U.S. expropriation claims through
diplomacy alone was evident as early as 1959.

A. THE HISTORICAL BREAK IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA
As
formalized trade relations with the
Soviet Union, expropriated U.S.-owned properties, and increased
taxes on U.S. imports, the U.S. responded with escalating economic
penalties.10 After the U.S. significantly decreased Cuban sugar
imports, [o]

6

See Bradley Gilmore, U.S.-Cuba Compensation Policy, 8 TEX. H ISP.
J. L. & POL Y 79, 81 (2002).
7
See Timothy Ashby, U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal
Reality and Likely Settlement Mechanism, 40 U. M IAMI INTER. AM. L. REV.
413, 419 (2009).
8
See, MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE C UBAN N ATIONALIZATION 7 (1976).
9
See Ashby, supra note 7, at 420.
10
Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (last updated January 19, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/us-cuba-relations.
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to leave the island.11 Two days later, the United States announced the
formal breaking of diplomatic relations with the Cuban government. 12
A few months later, on April 15, a U.S. aircraft bombed three
airports in Cuba.13 Cuban mercenaries armed and trained by the U.S.
landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17 but were defeated by the Cuban
army.14 This was the catalyst for Castro declaration of the socialist
revolution.15 These events concretized the ensuing stalemate between
the countries for decades to follow.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the international community
was shocked to discover the grave economic situation in Cuba.16
Economic conditions in Cuba worsened when Cubans were deprived
of the basic food and necessities usually imported from the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. 17
vulnerable state to increase economic pressure on the Castro
government.18 Instead of yielding to this pressure, the Cuban
government responded to its economic downturn with a series of
internal economic changes affecting its property laws in an effort to
attract new and much needed foreign investment. 19 The revival of
foreign investment in Cuba was viewed by the United States as a threat
to its legal claims to previously-expropriated property. 20 More
stringent requirements for lifting the U.S. embargo came after four
Cuban-Americans were killed when a Brothers to the Rescue plane

11

Gilmore, supra note 6, at 84.
See DOMINGUEZ & PROVOST, supra note 5, at 49.
13
See id.
14
See id.
15
See JONATHON D. ROSEN & H ANNA S. KASSAB, U.S. CUBA
RELATIONS C HARTING A NEW PATH 61 (2016).
16
See Andrew Zimbalist, Treading Water: Cuba's Economic and
Political Crisis, in C UBA AND THE FUTURE 7, 7-11 (Donald E. Schulz ed.,
1994).
17
See DOMINGUEZ & PROVOST, supra note 5, at 99.
18
See id. at 104.
19
See Zimbalist, supra note 16, at 11.
20
See DOMINGUEZ & PROVOST supra note 5, at 107.
12
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was shot down by Cuban military in 1996.21 Determining that
Fidel Castro had directly given the order to shoot down the plane,
Congress sought to further increase the economic and trade restrictions
against Cuba, culminating in the passing of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996. 22 Among other wideexpropriated property before the lifting of the embargo and created a
property in Cuba.23 By 2001, the U.S. policy toward Cuba sought to
compel a transition to democracy on the island through economic
pressure.24 President George W. Bush maintained the same policies
toward Cuba.25 The relationship between the U.S. and Cuba remained
unchanged until 2008.

B. THE START OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA
President Barrack Obama
2016, marked a
26
historical shift in U.S.-Cuba policy.
In his first term,
President
remittances to Cuba, and allowed people-to-people exchanges.27

21

See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 67.
See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (HelmsBurton Act), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 (2012); see also 104 Cong. Rec. E271-04,
S1510-02, S1479-04 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996).
23
See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22, at § 6082(a)(1)(A).
24
See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 65-66; U.S. D EP T OF S TATE,
U.S.-C UBA
RELATIONS,
https://20012009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/2558.htm (last visited Jun. 11, 2018).
25
See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 67.
26
See CUBA S TUDY GROUP, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S.
Policy
Toward
Cuba
4
(2013),
http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032.
27
See DOMINGUEZ & PROVOST, supra note 5, at 129-50; see also infra
Section II.C. (President Clinton had made some on these changes before the
22
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However, it was not until December 2014 that President Obama
Cuba, reopen the U.S. embassy, and remove Cuba from the list of state
28

Neither the American, nor Cuban people are well served by a
rigid policy that is rooted in events that took place before
most of us were born. Consider that for more than 35 years,
a far larger country also
governed by a Communist party. Nearly two decades ago,
we reestablished relations with Vietnam, where we fought a
war that claimed more Americans than any Cold War
confrontation. 29
to create democratic change in Cuba, instead of forcing democratic
changes through external economic pressure and coercion.
In May 2015, Cuba was removed from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism.30 The U.S. embassy in Cuba was reopened in August
2015.31 Before leaving office, Obama also reversed the United
longCubans fleeing Cuba to legally immigrate to the U.S. and become U.S.
citizens.32

C. OTHER RECENT CHANGES
Recently, there have been some changes in leadership in the
Cuban government and the Cuban economic model. In November

enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, and President Bush kept some of those
changes but reversed some as well).
28
ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 72.
29
President Barrack Obama, supra note 2.
30
See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 73.
31
Id. at 74.
32
Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Frances Robles, U.S. Ends Special
Treatment for Cuban Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), at A1.
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2016, Fidel Castro died. President Raul Castro stated that he would
step down in 2018 and did so in April.33 Before stepping down,
President Raul Castro changed some of the leadership in Cuba, and
commenced the process of implementing a new economic reform
plan.34
liberalization of its economy, including significant changes to its
foreign investment laws. 35 Some small private businesses are legal in
Cuba, although the licensing process remains unpredictable. 36 Cuba
has entered into forty bilateral investment treaties signaling a respect
for the legitimacy of international investment law. 37
Public opinion in the U.S. and in Cuba generally supports a
change to the U.S.-Cuba relationship.38 Many Americans, including
many Cuban-Americans, are ready for a change in U.S.-Cuba
relations. 39 The younger Cuban-American demographic is especially

33

See Marc Frank, Cuban Leader Raul Castro Says He Will Resign in
2018, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2013, 7:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscuba-castro/cuban-leader-raul-castro-says-he-will-retire-in-2018idUSBRE91N0HB20130225. Nicole Acevedo & Carmen Sesin, Miguel Diaz, NBC NEWS (Apr.
19, 2018, 9:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/miguel-d-azcanel-becomes-cuba-s-president-ra-l-n867021.
34
See COLLIN LAVERTY, CUBA S NEW RESOLVE ECONOMIC REFORM
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE
AMERICAS (2011).
35
See, e.g., Foreign Investment Act, 1995, No. 77, amended in 2014,
No. 118 (Cuba).
36
See, e.g., Law, 1993, No. 41 (Cuba) (allowing small private
businesses to operate in certain occupations and giving approximately 170,000
Cubans licenses to run private businesses). In 1994, Cuba also legalized the
use of U.S. dollars, eliminated government grants, and opened the agricultural
sector to market forces.
37
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
38
See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 109-23.
39
See id.
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enthusiastic for positive change and access to the island. 40 However,
even hopeful Cuban-Americans remain very concerned with the
continuing human rights abuses in Cuba and Cuban policies that affect
ability to visit the U.S.. 41
On the other hand, many Republicans and Cuban-American
hardliners in Congress, such as Marco Rubio, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, and
Ileana RosU.S.-Cuba policy.42
-sided
concessions lacking any credible commitment from Cuba for
democratic change on the island.43
Meanwhile, congressional Democrats tend to support lifting the
embargo.44 In January 2016, House Democrats introduced a bill to lift
the embargo that would repeal the Helms-Burton Act. 45
President Donald Trump official Cuba policy aligns with those
of the Republican hardliners, due to his strong relationship with the
Cuban-American contingent on the Hill.46 After the election, Trump
has demanded Cuban concessions and described Fidel after his death

40

See Eric Hershberg & William M. LeoGrande, Conclusion: Keys to
Assessing Progress Toward Establishing Normal Relations between the
United States and Cuba, in A NEW CHAPTER IN US-C UBA RELATIONS 197
(2016).
41
See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 118-23.
42
See id. at 99.
43
See, e.g., Sabrina Siddiqui, Marco Rubio: I Will Absolutely Roll
Back Obama Cuba Policy, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 10, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/10/marco-rubio-cubaobama-policy-roll-back.
44
See id. at 112.
45
See Cuba Reconciliation Act, H.R. 574, 115th Cong. (2017).
46
See Patricia Mazzei, Marco Rubio and his wife will dine with the
Trumps at the White House, THE MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 14, 2017,
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/donaldtrump/article132778559.html.
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47

The Helms-Burton Act, supported by the majority of
Republicans and hardliners alike, requires resolution of the
expropriated property claims as a prerequisite to lifting the embargo. 48
Thus, a shift toward resolution of these claims is in line with the
-Burton Act requirements.49
If Trump follows through with hardline tactics that further isolate
Cuba, he will garner support from the Cuban-American community
and Republican members of Congress, but the tactics will likely rollback the progress in building trust with Cuba that has been gained
under Obama and will undermine the U.S. interest in resolving its
claims.50 In addition to the state of affairs in the U.S., recent events in
52
Cuba51
also serve to exacerbate the breaking down of the relationship between
the U.S. and Cuba.

47

GLOBE STAFF
Oppressed His Own People, B OSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2016,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/11/26/trump-says-castrowas-brutal-dictator-who-oppressed-his-ownpeople/t23gmg21BSqLqM8Bqs2CWP/story.html.
48
See COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, Helms-Burton Act:
Resurrecting the Iron Curtain (June 10, 2011), http://www.coha.org/helmsburton-act-resurrecting-the-iron-curtain/; Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22, at
§ 6067.
49
See id.
50
Cf. Marc Frank,
and trade policy, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2017, 10:48 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-castro/cubas-raul-castro-blaststrumps-mexican-wall-and-trade-policy-idUSKBN16D0BM.
51
See Patrick Oppmann & Laura Koranh, Senate Holds Hearings on
, CNN (Jan. 9, 2018, 1:15
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/09/politics/senate-cuba-sonic-attackshearing/index.html.
52
See Sarah Marsh, Under Siege at Home, Maduro Gets Support from
Regional Allies in Cuba, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2017, 11:25 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-venezuela/under-siege-at-homemaduro-gets-support-from-regional-allies-in-cuba-idUSKBN17D0AJ
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On the other hand, a Republican-dominated Congress and the
Trump administration could
withholding outright endorsement of those advances to induce Cuba to
promise of a one-party dominated Congress to amend or repeal
economic and trade restrictions against Cuba can also be used to
induce Cuba to compensate the U.S. for its expropriated property
claims and other legal claims it may have against Cuba.

D. CONCLUSION
Historically, economically, socially, and legally, the time is ripe
to resolve the outstanding expropriation claims. The Trump
administration should take steps to ensure that the change in
administration is not a barrier to the settlement with Cuba of the
outstanding 5,911 certified property claims.53
proposing fresh ideas on ways to move forward that take into account
U.S. interests in resolving its legal claims against Cuba and addressing
human rights violations in Cuba. With the right perspective, a
Republican-dominated Congress could provide Trump with
lessening the trade and economic sanctions to one that balances lifting
the embargo with achieving the full array of its political and economic
goals in Cuba, beginning with resolving U.S. expropriation claims
against Cuba.
y and its effect
on U.S.-Cuba relations. Even a short historical accounting of the
relationship between the two nations reveals how fragile it is. A
history of mistrust and subversion creates a situation of
hypersensitivity; where even minor miscommunications or shifts in
policy can prove detrimental to diplomatic progress. Building trust
and respect between the Cuban and U.S. administrations is essential.

53

See Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress,
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE,
56
(2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44822.pdf.
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interference in Cuban internal affairs in the future is harmful for
building trust b
humanrights record, historical anti-American rhetoric and role as a rallying
point against the U.S. is problematic for their future relationship.
Therefore, continued and dedicated diplomacy should focus on
relationship-building and trust-building methods to facilitate
negotiations of any kind. 54
One such method involves choosing legitimate criteria or
standards of fairness to govern the process of the negotiations that are
independent of the will of either coun
but that account
55
for their interests. If the U.S. and Cuba would agree that international
law governs some of their outstanding legal claims against each other,
then they can utilize international law as a fair framework to guide the
negotiation process.

II.
DIPLOMACY ALONE IS UNLIKELY TO
RESOLVE THE COMPLEX LEGAL CLAIMS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA
A. INTRODUCTION
This section will analyze the measures taken by Cuba to
nationalize U.S. property and the measures taken by the U.S. to
enforce the embargo against Cuba. Both states have implemented
legislation and taken other steps that further complicate their ability to
fully restore diplomatic relations. The U.S. legal claims against Cuba
sing from the Cuban
nationalization, expropriation, intervention, or other

54

See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR MAKING,
MANAGING AND MENDING DEALS AROUND THE WORLD IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 53-57 (2003).
55
See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES : NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 81-94 (2d ed. 1991).

2017

RESOLVING LEGAL C LAIMS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND C UBA

155

in Cuba from 1959-1967.56 These legal claims may include claims of
current U.S. citizens who were Cuban nationals at the time of the
property to which they held title, 57 and claims against the Cuban
58
This
section will go through these measures to argue that international law
provides a fair framework to determine the validity of the U.S. claims
and the appropriate compensation standard.
and economic damages, 59 from the long-standing U.S. economic
sanctions60 and personal injury damages sustained by Cubans killed or
harmed by alleged U.S. hostilities.61 The economic damages sought

56

See 22 U.S.C. § 1643(b) (2012).
See Helms Burton Act, supra note 22, at. § 6022(6) (2012).
58
See CONSEJO DE ESTADO, Ley No. 989, printed in GACETA OFICIAL
Oct. 16, 2012, no 44 (Cuba).
57

59

state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/07/245094.htm.
See REPUBLIC OF C UBA, On Resolution 69/5 of the United Nations

60

and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against
36-37
(June
2015),
http://www.cubavsbloqueo.cu/sites/default/files/INFORME%20BLOQUEO
%202015%20-%20EN.pdf. Specifically, an estimated $121 billion in
economic damages.
61

económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por los Estados Unidos de
October
29,
2013,
New
York,
New
York,
http://www.cubaminrex.cu/es/intervencion-del-ministro-de-relacionesexteriores-de-cuba-bruno-rodriguez-parrilla-en-el-6831, 1999, http://www.cuba.cu/ gobierno/DEMANDA.html; Richard E.
Feinberg, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba Transforming Trauma
into Opportunity 1, 7 (Dec. 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
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by Cuba stem from the effects of the U.S. embargo on various Cuban
industries.62 Further, the Cuban government claims that U.S. acts of
terrorism against Cuba have caused 3,478 deaths and 2,099 disabling
injuries.63 These acts include CIA-activities in Cuba, the Bay of Pigs
invasion, the explosion of the French vessel La Coubre, the bombing
of Cuban Airlines Flight 455 in 1976, aggressions from the U.S. naval
base in Guantanamo, assassination of diplomat Félix GarcíaRodriguez, and biological warfare. 64 This section will examine those
measures to show that customary international law also provides a fair
In response
Cuba, the U.S. would likely raise claims against Cuba for similar
actions taken by Cuba against the U.S.65
These use-of-force claims are more politically sensitive and less
likely to be successfully submitted for resolution under international
law to a third-party neutral. Moreover, the factual information
required to analyze these claims under international law is not readily
available and is likely classified. Thus, this paper will not directly
address these claims here. However, by tackling the economic claims
first, agreeing that they are governed by international law, and
submitting them to a legal mechanism for resolution, the respective
governments will be able to then focus on the more sensitive political
matters through diplomatic channels.

content/uploads/2016/07/Reconciling-US-Property-Claims-in-CubaFeinberg.pdf.
62
See Parrilla supra note 61, at 11-25, 36 (In the 2015 report to the
United Nations General Assembly, Cuba asserted that the accumulated
economic damages from the U.S. economic sanctions had reached $121
billion.); Feinberg supra note 61, at 13.
63
See REPUBLIC OF CUBA, Necesidad de poner fin al bloqueo
económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por los Estados Unidos de
America contra Cuba (July 2014); Feinberg supra note 61, at 13.
64
See OLGA M IRANDA BRAVO, NACIONALIZACIONES Y B LOQUEO
(1996); Feinberg supra note 61, at 14.
65
See e.g., Alejandre supra note 4.
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In light of the longstanding failure of diplomacy alone and the
fragility of the relationship between the countries, agreeing that
international law governs their compensation and damages claims will
provide a certain legitimacy to the negotiation process. In truth, this
should not be too hard. Both the U.S. and Cuba have through treaties,66
domestic legislation, 67 and their respective U.N. voting record 68
exhibited that international law should govern many of their legal
claims against the other. Submitting these claims to a third-party
neutral mediator, 69 arbitrator,70 or some other agreed-upon legal
process71 (some of which will be explored in section IV) will help
resolve these complex legal claims and allow the parties to focus
political capital on more sensitive and pressing issues. The next two
sub-sections will explore how the complexity of the claims and the

66

See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947); General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade: Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33I.L.M. 1124 (Apr. 15,1994).
67
See, e.g., Cuban Claims Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (2017).
68
See, e.g., Declaration on the Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV) (Oct. 21, 1954) [Declaration on Friendly Relation].
69
See Richard Bilder, An Overview of International Dispute
Settlement, 1 EMORY J. INT'L D ISP. RESOL. 1, 25
request or agree to limited intervention by a third party to help them break the
impasse. . . . [T]he mediator usually plays a more active part in facilitating
communications and negotiations between the parties, and is sometimes
permitted or expected to advance informal and nonbinding proposals of his or
70

See id.
series of disputes, by the agreement of the parties, to an ad hoc tribunal for
71

See id.
-finding, inquiry and
conciliation. These are methods of settlement in which the parties request or
agree to the intervention of a third party, usually on a more formal basis, for
the purpose of determining particular facts or otherwise conducting an
impartial examination of the dispute and, if the parties so agree, attempting to
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hardened positions of each country as reflected in their national
legislation significantly decreases the likelihood of settlement strictly
through diplomatic channels.

B. THE CUBAN EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. PROPERTY
is used by many U.S. laws and
regulations to describe the Cuban property takings. 72 Cuba has
insisted that the U.S. properties in Cuba were expropriated, not
taking of property usually an industry or a sector of the economy to
be owned by the state without any implication of compensation to
the owner.73
nationalization, but without any suggestion of subsequent operation
or ownership solely by the state. Expropriation implies the designation
of property for a public purpose unrelated to the owner of the property
but subject to compensation to the owner. 74 Under international law,
the essential feature of expropriation is the taking of property by the

72

See, e.g., Helms Burton Act, supra note 22, at § 6023(4).
(A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other
seizure by the Cuban Government of ownership or control of property, on or
after January 1, 1959 (i) without the property having been returned or
adequate and effective compensation provided; or (ii) without the claim to the
property having been settled pursuant to an international claims settlement
agreement or other mutually accepted settlement procedure; and (B) the
repudiation by the Cuban Government of, the default by the Cuban
Government on, or the failure of the Cuban Government to pay, on or after
January 1, 1959 (i) a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized,
expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government; (ii) a debt which
is a charge on property nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by the
Cuban Government; or (iii) a debt which was incurred by the Cuban
73
74

See GORDON, supra note 8, at 119 n.24.
See id.
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state.75 For purposes of this paper the term expropriation will be used
to describe the takings of U.S. property in Cuba.
STAGE ONE: CUBAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS ON EXPROPRIATION
Prior to 1959, the Cuban Constitution prohibited the confiscation
of property. To that effect, Article 24 of the 1940 Constitution stated:
Confiscation of property is prohibited. No person shall be
deprived of their property except by a competent judicial
authority and for a justified cause of public utility or social
interest and always subject to a cash payment and
indemnification, effectuated judicially. The failure to meet these
requirements will result in the right of the expropriated to be
immune from the Justice Tribunals and the property be returned.
In case of a challenge, the justice tribunal will determine the
public utility or social interest and the need for expropriation to
correspond. 76

property a fundamental right under Articles 24 and 87, guaranteeing to
all Cubans the right to own and use property freely. 77 Article 24
prohibited the government taking of property without a judicial
determination of just cause and public purpose, and it further provided
that any government taking of property must be accompanied by
indemnification in cash.78 Article 87 recognized the Cuban right to
private property to the fullest extent, limited only for public necessity

75

See OECD,
in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on International
Investment,
No.
2004/04
(Sept.
2004),
available
at
https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_4.pdf.
76
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE C UBA, art. 24, 1940.
77
See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE C UBA, art. 24, amended by
Ley Fundamental de La Republica printed in GACETA OFICIAL 1959, no. 5123.
78
See id.
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or social interest as established by law.79 Robust amendment
requirements also worked to strengthen the property protections. 80
-enactment of the 1940 Constitution through
the Fundamental Law of the Republic on February 7, 1959, contained
nearly all of the original provisions and protections. 81 The first
amendment was the addition of Article 232. 82 This amendment in
effect gave the newly-designated Council of Ministers (Council) the
right to amend the Constitution without deliberation in derogation of
the more stringent requirements set forth in in the 1940 Constitution. 83
As part of that first amendment, the Council changed the language of
Article 24.84 Although not abolishing the right to property completely,
confiscation of property.
Council that would form the basis for major expropriations and
confiscations in that year. 85 Eventually, the language of Article 24 was
changed again in 1960 as follows:
No person shall be deprived of their property except by competent
authority and for a cause of public utility or social or national
interest. The law shall regulate the procedure for expropriation
and shall establish legislation and forms of payment and shall
determine the competent authority to declare the case to be of

79
80
81

24.

82

See id. at art. 87.
See id. at art. 285-286.
See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE C UBA, supra note 76, art.

See id. at art. 23.
See id.
84
Id. at art. 24.
85
See, e.g., Ley 78, Feb. 13, 1959, Gaceta Oficial (Cuba); Ley 151,
Mar. 17, 1959, Gaceta Oficial (Cuba).
83
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public utility or social or national interest and that expropriation
is necessary. 86

Compensation for expropriated property was no longer a
constitutional requirement.
STAGE TWO: THE AGRARIAN REFORM ACT
AND THE UNITED STATES INITIAL RESPONSE
The initial Cuban measure resulting in the expropriation of U.S.owned property was the Agrarian Reform Act of June 3, 1959.87 The
essentially limiting holdings to small and medium-sized farms, [and]
coment acreage
88
for the interests of Cuban economic progress. The Act converted
agricultural estates larger than five hectares into state-owned farms.
The Act also provided that all stockholders of companies owning
sugar-cane lands would have to be Cuban citizens.89 Although it
orm Act entailed substantial
taking of U.S. property, since a large percentage of the land
90

Article 29 of the Act recognized the constitutional right of landowners affected by this Law to receive an indemnity for the
expropriated property. 91 Accordingly, the Act provided a mechanism
for compensation provided in the form of twenty-year government

86

Ley de Reforma Constitucional, art. 24, printed in GACETA OFICIAL
July 5, 1960 (Cuba).
87
Amir Rafat, Legal Aspects of the Cuban Expropriation of AmericanOwned Property, 11 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 45, 46 (1966).
88
GORDON, supra note 8, at 75.
89
Id.
90
Rafat, supra note 87, at 46.
91
See Ley de Reforma Agraria, at art. 29 printed in GACETA OFICIAL
Jun. 3, 1959, No. 7 (Cuba).
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bonds with 4.5% interest, payable in non-convertible exchange. 92 The
sm was to be implemented by Law
93
numbers 576 and 588.
Law 576 authorized the issuance of the
twenty-year bond in the amount of 100 million pesos (approximately
$1 million) to be issued in different denominations with interest
payable semi-annually, and compensation of less than 100 pesos was
to be paid in cash.94 Law 588 determined the valuation of the land for
declared taxable value from October 1958, which could not be
challenged in court.95 However, the compensation plan was dead on
arrival and never implemented nor accepted by the U.S.. 96 Further, the
Act was never carried out as enacted. 97 Instead, the National Institute
of Agrarian Reform (INRA) acted arbitrarily with broad powers by
physically removing owners from the property without any receipt or

92

See id. at art. 31 (This compensation scheme was similar to the one
that Mexico had offered the United States in 1938, after it expropriated
American-owned oil refineries, which the United States found not to be
compliant with international law. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.).
93
Ley No. 576, printed in GACETA OFICIAL Sep. 25 1959 (Cuba); Ley
No. 588, printed in GACETA OFICIAL Oct. 7, 1959 (Cuba).
94
George Harper, Cuban and Peruvian Agrarian Reforms: At the
Crossroads, 24 MIAMI. L. REV. 763, 768 (1970).
95
Ley No. 588, supra note 93, at arts. 5 & 13.
96
To generate the revenue necessary to pay for the property, Castro
proposed that the United States increase its purchase of Cuban sugar from 3
million tons of sugar per year to 8 million tons, something that was impossible
to implement.
gar output was 5.9 million tons and it
had never produced more than 7.2 million tons. See
U.S.
Informs Cuba of Views on Agrarian Reform Law 958, 40 Bull. 1044 (1959) [
U.S. Dipl. Note on ARL]; See also John W. Smagula, Redirecting Focus:
Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the Stalemate, 21
N.C. J. INT L L. & COMP. REG
realistic or desirable to subsidize a Government engaging in extraordinary acts
97

See GORDON, supra note 8, at 134.
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acknowledgment.98 INRA made up the rules for expropriation as it
went along.99
The U.S. Department of State expressed its concerns over Cuban
treatment of U.S. property in a diplomatic note on June 11, 1959.100 In
international law a state has the
101

political stability, and so

However, the U.S.

the corresponding obligation to provide prompt, adequate, and
102
As for the
compensation provision in the Act, the Ambassador expressed concern
103
Further, the Ambassador
for expropriation.104 From the start, the U.S. framed the conflict as one
governed by international law.
The Cuban government responded by admitting it had an
obligation under the 1940 Constitution to provide prompt and full
into which the overthrown tyranny plunged the country and the marked
105

The U.S. answered that the
expropriating state cannot use domestic problems to excuse its

98
99
100
101
102
103
104

See id. at 135.
See id. at 76.
U.S. Dipl. Note on ARL, supra note 96, at 958-59 (emphasis added).
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id. at 959.
Id; see also CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, supra note

76.
105

Rafat, supra note 87, at 58 (citing Cuban Note of June15, 1959,
supplied by the U.S. Department of State, unpublished document on file with
Western Reserve University Law Library).
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es of international law relating to the
106

pay compensation for the expropriations under the Agrarian Reform
Laws, the U.S. framed the duty as governed by international law and
Cuba framed it as governed by national law and subject to domestic
compensation mirrored an on-going debate throughout the 1970s and
1980s on the traditional and partial compensation principle under
customary international law, which will be discussed further in the
next section.
In response to multiple accusations from Cuba against the U.S.
that its demands for payment were obstructive to its land reform
the question of compensation in accordance with accepted principles
107

STAGE THREE: COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF
FOREIGN-PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN CUBA
The Cuban government passed the next and most significant law
expropriating American property and assets Law 851
(Nationalization Law) on July 6, 1960.108 The Nationalization Law
authorized the Cuban government to forcefully expropriate all
American property interests in defense of Cuban national interest. 109

106

Id. at 58-59 (citing to U.S. Note of Oct. 12, 1959, supplied by the

University Law Library).
107
See U.N. Doc. A/4537 at 13 (Oct. 13, 1960).
108 See Ley 851, printed in GACETA OFICIAL Jul. 13, 1960 (Cuba).
109 See id. at Preamble.
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U.S. political aggression, obligating the Cuban government to adopt
such a sweeping expropriation measure. 110
Nationalization Law compensation arrangement also relied on
ramping up the sugar quota, but would also be impossible since the
U.S. had already cut the sugar quota. 111
Foreign Relations in which Ambassador Bonsal wrote:
The Nationalization Law is both arbitrary and confiscatory in
that its provisions for compensation for property seized fail to
meet the most minimum criteria necessary to assure the payment
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation and in its specific
prohibition of any form of judicial or administrative appeal from
the resolutions of the expropriating authorities. 112

In furtherance of the mandates of the Nationalization Law,
Resolution numbers 1, 2, and 3 transferred all American-owned
enterprises into state ownership. 113 These resolutions provided for the
nationalization of the Cuban Telephone Company, the Cuban Electric
Company, the Sinclair Oil companies, the thirty five remaining sugar
mills, several other companies, and three U.S. banks. 114 The
resolutions also authorized the expropriation of the remaining 166 U.S.
companies operating in Cuba. 115

110

See id.
Proclamation No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960).
112
U.S. Protests New Cuban Law Directed at
American Property 171, 43 Bull. 1101 (Aug. 1, 1960) (emphasis added).
113
See Rafat, supra note 87, at 47.
114
See Resolución No. 1, Aug. 6, 1960, art. XXIII, Leyes del Gobierno
Provisional de la Revolución 181 (Cuba). See GORDON, supra note 8, at 101,
102; See also Resolución No. 2, Sep. 17, 1960 art. XXIV, Leyes del Gobierno
Provisional de la Revolución 127 (Cuba).
115 See Resolución No. 3, Oct. 24, 1960, art. XXV, Leyes del Gobierno
Provisional de la Revolución 181 (Cuba). See GORDON, supra note 8, at 104.
111
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Before Resolution No. 3, on October 13, 1960, the Cuban
government passed Law Nos. 890116 and 891.117 Law Nos. 890 and
that of a planned economy118 and nationalize 382 major companies and
banks.119 These laws were part of a larger policy aimed at the complete
elimination of foreign-owned private investment in all but minor
businesses.120 Many Cuban businesses were also expropriated at that
time.121
Finally, Cuba passed Law No. 989 of 1961, which authorized the
122
This law was implemented by
Resolution 454, which provided that Cubans leaving the country for
the U.S. had twenty-nine days to return to Cuba, those traveling
elsewhere had sixty days, and those traveling to Europe had ninety
days.123 Failure to return to Cuba within those time periods was
deemed a permanent departure from the country, rendering the
124
This law remains in effect
today.
CONCLUSION
failing to provide U.S. companies and citizens

116

See Ley 890, printed in GACETA OFICIAL 13 Oct. 13, 1960 (Cuba).
See Ley 891, printed in GACETA OFICIAL 13 Oct. 13, 1960 (Cuba).
118 See Rafat, supra note 87, at 48.
119
See GORDON, supra note 8, at 103.
120
See id.
121 See id. at 104.
122 See Ley No. 989, printed in GACETA OFICIAL Dec. 6, 1961 (Cuba).
123
See Resolución No. 454, printed in GACETA OFICIAL Oct. 9, 1961
(Cuba) (In reality, those wishing to leave Cuba after 1961 were required to
turn their assets over to the state before being granted final authorization to
depart; their personal property upon departing was also arbitrarily taken by
bject to this process in 1970 and
1980.).
124 See id.
117

2017

RESOLVING LEGAL C LAIMS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND C UBA

167

from 1959-1963.125 The U.S. claim is two-fold. First, the alleged
settlement offers made by Cuba and the compensation schemes
provided in each expropriation measure were illusory. Second, even
if they were not illusory, the expropriation measures and settlement
offers failed to provide for full compensation as required by
international law.
it was obligated to provide compensation, and its offers to do so were
rejected by the U.S. at its own peril. Additionally, even if the U.S.
standard of compensation was applicable, the economic situation in
compensation at the time of the takings.126 Thus, the countries differ
on whether international law or national law applies to expropriation
of foreign nationals and what standard of compensation is appropriate.
One complicating factor worth mentioning is the mass exodus of
Cuban-Americans whose property and assets were confiscated as
punishment for leaving the island who have claims against the Cuban
government. As noted in section I, this group is a formidable voting
bloc for Republicans and has a strong lobby in Washington, DC. Many
personal and real property and have raised claims against the Cuban
government arising from human rights violations. Their claims,
however, are not recognized by international law, since international
investment law and related international claims arise from notions of
diplomatic protection of aliens, not nationals, at the time of the
expropriation.127 Yet, any deal with Cuba or normalization of relations
with Cuba will need to address these claims. Therefore, in sections
IV, V, and VI, this paper explores different ways in which these claims

125

See, e.g., U.S. Dipl. Note ARL, supra note 96, at 959.
See, e.g., id. at 959.
127
David Collins, An Introduction to International Investment Law 11
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2017); see De Sanchez v. Banco Central de
Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir., 1985).
126
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can be included as part of a larger bargain with Cuba along with the
advantages and disadvantages of doing so.

C. THE UNITED STATES EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
The U.S. embargo against Cuba also went through several stages.
At first, the U.S. embargo was characterized as a countermeasure to
U.S. property. It was aimed at the
enforcement of international law standards of compensation against
Cuba.128 Then, the embargo was strengthened in response to national
security concerns culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis.129
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. embargo was intended to
and political rights.130 By the end of the 1990s, it served to deter
foreign aid to Cuba and foreign investment in Cuba that would
undermine the value of the U.S. expropriated property claims against
Cuba.131
STAGE ONE: THE EMBARGO AS A COUNTERMEASURE AGAINST C UBA S
MASS UNCOMPENSATED TAKINGS OF U.S. PROPERTY
On October 13, 1960, President Eisenhower, under the authority
of the Export Control Act, 132 announced a complete ban on U.S.
exports to Cuba except for non-subsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and
medical supplies.133 The Export Act expressly authorized the
the foreign policy of the U.S. and to aid in fulfilling its international

128
129
130
131

See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (2012).
See, e.g., Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 1959-63 (1962).
See, e.g., Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6010 (2017).
See, e.g., Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22; 28 U.S.C. § 1611

(2012).

132

50 U.S.C. §§ 2021-32 (repealed in 1969).
See U.S.
of State, United States Institutes Controls on Exports
to Cuba, 958, 43 Bull. 715 (Oct. 19, 1960) [Eisenhower Statement on
Embargo].
133
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Accordingly, President Eisenhower stated the U.S.

of the [United States] against discriminatory, aggressive, and injurious
135
In 1961, before the Bay
of Pigs invasion but after the official break of diplomatic relations,
Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act. 136 The FAA required that
the Cuban government compensate the U.S. for the taking of property
in accordance with international law before it could provide Cuba with
financial assistance and lift the embargo:
Except as may be deemed necessary by the President. . . no
assistance shall be furnished . . . to any government of Cuba, nor
shall Cuba be entitled to receive any quota . . . or to receive any
other benefits . . . until the President determines that such
government . . . according to international law return to the
United States citizens . . . or to provide equitable compensation
for, property taken from such citizens and entities on or after
January 1, 1959, by the government of Cuba. 137

As evidenced by the language of the FAA and the 1959 U.S.
diplomatic note in response to the Agrarian Reform Act, the U.S.
framed the embargo
violation of international law.138
STAGE TWO: STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO IS JUSTIFIED BY THE
NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT OF THE CUBA-SOVIET ALLIANCE
President Kennedy strengthened the embargo in response to the
growing Soviet military presence in Cuba.139 On February 6, 1962,

134

S. 63, 81st Cong. § 2(b) (1949) (emphasis added).
Smagula, supra note 96, at 75.
136
See Foreign Assistance Act, supra note 128, at § 2370.
137 Id. at § 2370(a)(2) (emphasis added).
138
See U.S. DEP T OF STATE, U.S. Informs Cuba of Views on Agrarian
Reform Law, 40 Bull. 958 (1959); see also Foreign Assistance Act, supra note
128at § 2151 (2000).
139 See Proclamation No. 3447, supra note 129.
135
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the President announced a trade embargo that prevented the imports
into the U.S. of any goods of Cuban origin, except as permitted by the
U.S. Department of Treasury. 140
on
cited the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,141 to urge
member states of the Organization of American States (OAS)
those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual and
selfis incompatible with
the principles and objectives of the Inter142
The
President also confirmed that the Cuban trade restrictions were
143

In 1963 after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Treasury Department
issued the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) 144 under the
authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA). 145
TWEA was amended in 1933 to cover peacetime national
emergencies 146
comprehensive embargoes on foreign countries as one means of
147
dealing with both peacetime emergenc
The
[Cuba], or any national thereof, has . . . any interest of any nature

140

See id.
Inter-American Treaty Of Reciprocal Assistance, Organization of
American States (1947).
142
Proclamation No. 3447, supra note 129.
143 Id.
144
31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.901 (2017).
145
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4341 (2017).
146 See 12 U.S.C. § 95 (2012).
147 Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
141
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148
149

STAGE THREE: STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO
AIMS TO INDUCE DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN CUBA
AND TOPPLE THE C ASTRO GOVERNMENT
U.S. legislation passed in the 1990s significantly expanded the
breadth of the embargo against Cuba and demanded democratic and
capitalist change in Cuba to lift the embargo. 150 For example, the
president was authorized to allow the export of food, medicine, and
other humanitarian assistance to Cuba only if he determined that Cuba
was undergoing a democratic transition as defined by the Cuban
Democracy Act (CDA). 151 To lift the embargo as codified in the CDA,
the president had to report to Congress that Cuba made a commitment
to hold fair and transparent elections conducted under internationally
recognized observers and that it was respecting civil and political
rights.152
In support of the CDA, Congress made the following findings:
The government of Fidel Castro has demonstrated consistent
disregard for internationally accepted standards of human rights
and for democrati
exercise of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and other rights
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
December 10, 1948. It has refused to admit into Cuba the

148

31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201(a) (2018).
Id. at (b)(1).
150
See Cuban Democracy Act, supra note 130; Helms-Burton Act,
supra note 22.
151 See Cuban Democracy Act, supra note 130, at § 6006.
152 See id. at § 6007.
149
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representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission
appointed to investigate human rights violations on the island. 153

application of sanctions directed at the Castro government and support
154
155

Four years later, Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, which
codified the embargo with the express aim of destabilizing the Cuban
government.156 The Helms-Burton Act went significantly further than
negotiate compensation for nationalized property, and normalize
relations with Cuba.157 This Act remains in effect today. 158
Title I of the Act prohibits the indirect financing of Cuban
interests,159
institutions,160 and reduces financial support to countries and
institutions that provide loans or other assistance to Cuba.161 Title I
also conditioned the reinstitution of family remittances and travel to
internal economy. 162
Title II purports to induce democratic change in Cuba through
certain stringent ultimatums.163 Title II sets forth guidelines for U.S.
assistance that is limited to a free and independent Cuba and permits

153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. at § 6001(1).
Id. at § 6002(1).
Id. at § 6002(5).
See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22.
See id. at §§ 6031-46.
See id.
See id. at § 6033(a).
See id. at § 6034(a).
See id. at § 6034(b).
See id. at § 6042.
See id. at §§ 6061-67.
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Further,
Title II authorizes lifting the embargo only when the president
determines that the Cuban government is democratically elected
according to a long and specific list of requirements.165
approach to the to the expropriated-property issue requires a new
Cuban government to commit to returning all expropriated property to
the U.S. or to provided full compensation for the properties in order to
be recognized by the U.S. as a democratically elected government
eligible for lifting the embargo.166
and
deter foreign investment in Cuba.
Under section 6082, any person
who traffics in confiscated property which once belonged to a U.S.
national is liable to that U.S. national for damages in U.S. federal
courts.168
167

and intentionally . . . engages in commercial activity using or otherwise
169
benefitting from confis
Although this Title has been
suspended by each consecutive U.S. president, 170 its potential
consequences are vast.
Notably, the right to sue for damages is extended to individuals
who were not U.S. nationals at the time of the confiscation but who
subsequently became U.S. nationals. 171 This means that all Cuban
nationals that fled Cuba since the Revolution, became U.S. citizens,

164

See id. at § 6062(a).
See id. at § 6064-65 (1996).
166 See id. at § 6065.
167 See id. at § 6022.
168
See 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (2012).
169
Id. § 6023(13)(A)(ii).
170 See U.S.-C UBA TRADE AND ECON. COUNCIL, INC., Update On Title
Three Suspension Of Libertad Act (Helms-Burton), (February 06, 2017),
http://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/2/6/update-on-title-three-suspension-oflibertad-act-helms-burton.
171 See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22, at § 6023(15).
165
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and can prove ownership of expropriated property or assets in Cuba,
can sue an alleged trafficker for damages. As of 2004, there were over
1.4 million Cuban U.S. citizens living in the U.S. who may be eligible
under Helms-Burton Act to sue a foreign investor for trafficking in
previously owned Cuban property. 172
In support of the Helms-Burton Act, Congress made twenty-eight
findings,173
international obligations. 174 One of the findings is that the U.S. has a
fundamental freedoms as expressed in the Charter of the United
175
The
confiscations of or taking of property belonging to United States
nationals [and] exploitation of this property [undermining] comity of
176

United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 177
178

citing to the following:
Article 39 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which,

172

See Maria Werlau, International Law and Other Considerations on
the Repatriation of Cuban Balseros by the United States, ASS N FOR THE
STUDY
CUBAN
ECON.
(November
30,
2004),
OF
THE
https://www.ascecuba.org/asce_proceedings/international-law-and-otherconsiderations-on-the-repatriation-of-cuban-balseros-by-the-united-states/.
173 See Helms-Burton Act supra note 22, at § 6021(1)-(28).
174
See id.
175
Id. at § 6021(9).
176 Id. at § 6081(2)
177
See id
The United Nations General Assembly
passed Resolution 47-139 on December 18, 1992, Resolution 48-142 on
December 20, 1993, and Resolution 49178 Id.
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determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken . . ., to maintain or restore
determined that massive and systematic violations of human
imposed sanctions due to such violations of human rights in the
cases of Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former
Yugoslavia. 179

After comparing Cuba to Haiti, 180 the Act points out that:
United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 of July 31, 1994,

democratically elected government of Haiti was restored to power
on October 15, 1994. The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in
a decisive manner to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for
36 years, and the continued failure to do so constitutes ethically
improper conduct by the international community. For the past
36 years, the Cuban Government has posed and continues to pose
a national security threat to the United States. 181

The U.S. Congress has continued to frame the embargo and its
conduct in the face of accepted international legal standards. 182
The Helms-Burton Act resulted in a serious limitation on U.S.
presidential and executive power to conduct foreign affairs with
Cuba.183
and received the Title III waiver, which Clinton immediately put to

179
180
181
182
183

Id. at § 6021(23)-(24).
See id. at § 6021(25).
Id. at § 6021(26)-(28).
See id. at § 6021.
See CUBA STUDY GROUP, supra note 26, at 1.
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use.184 President George W. Bush and President Obama would
eventually follow suit and continue to implement the waiver. 185 In
bypass elements of the Act, Congress passed the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 186 (TSRA), which
allowed U.S. entities to sell agricultural products directly to the Cuban
government but banned all travel to Cuba beyond previously
prescribed categories of travel. 187
At the direction of President Bush, the Treasury Department
amended the 1963 CACR to expand general license visits to close
relatives in Cuba, increase carry-on remittances for travelers to Cuba,
and facilitate humanitarian transactions with groups in Cuba dedicated
188
The humanitarian
assistance provision was criticized as illusory since it was clear that
the Cuban government would not permit assistance to aid its
opposition.189
In 2003, President Bush laid out plans for creating a Commission
for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC).190 The CAFC

184

See Rossella Brevetti & Peter Menyasz, Clinton Delays Lawsuits
Under Title III of Helms-Burton, 13 INT L. TRADE REP. 1158 (Jul. 17, 1996);
Clinton Extends Title III of Helms-Burton Act NAT L. J. CONGRESS DAILY
(Jan. 16, 1998).
185 See U.S.-C UBA TRADE AND ECON. COUNCIL, INC., supra note 170.
186
See Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549 (2000).
187 See 22 U.S.C. § 7202(a) (2012); see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(112) (2007) (explaining what the travel categories are).
188
31 C.F.R. § 515 (2007).
189
See John-Thor Dahlburg, Bush Brothers Keenly Attentive to Cuban
Americans, L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/
2002/may/22/nation/na-flagop22.
190
See
Report to the President (2004) [ CAFC I]; see also Remarks by the President
on Cuba, The WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, (October 10, 2003),
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like the Helms-Burton Act, aimed at ousting Fidel Castro and his
-Castro Cuba.191 To oust
groups in Cuba,192 deploying communications aircraft to increase
range of TV and radio transmissions to Cuba,193 limiting family
visits,194 reducing remittances,195 and limiting financial aid. 196 The
-Castro Cuba would then include providing
197
humanitarian aid, changing the education system to incorporate
non-communist curriculums, 198 promoting the rule of law,199 and
converting Cuba to a free-market economy.200 Importantly, these
reforms would include the settlement of all compensation claims based
on land expropriations.201 In 2006, CACF issued a second report
which called for the release of political prisoners in Cuba, the
disruption of the Cuban flow of currency, and the initiation of vast
domestic legal reforms.202

https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/10/
20031010-2.html.
191 See generally CAFC I, supra note 190
interactions with Cuba post-Castro regime).
192 See id. at 15-25.
193
See id. at 27-28.
194
See 31 C.F.R. § 515.561(a) (2007) (implementing recommendations
of CAFC I); see also CAFC I, supra note 190, at 41.
195
See 31 C.F.R. § 515.570(a) (2007) (implementing recommendations
of CAFC I); see also CAFC I, supra note 190, at 39-40.
196 See CAFC I, supra note 190, at 44-50.
197 See id. at 59-67.
198
See id. 97-98, 102-03.
199
See id. at 161-71, 175-81, 190-92, 196-98.
200 See id. at 214-17, 229-34, 273-315, 317, 345.
201
See id. at 224.
202
See
Report to the President, 32-33, 53-55 (2006), available at
http://www.cafc.gov/documents/organization/68166.pdf [CAFC II].
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By the end of the Bush administration, it seemed that the embargo
was even more severe than it had been even in the 1960s when Soviet
missiles on Cuban soil were aimed at the U.S.
STAGE FOUR: MOVEMENT TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH CUBA AND LOOSENING THE EMBARGO
As noted previously, Obama eased travel restrictions and enabled
remittances to Cuba and people-to-people exchanges.203 In December
2014, Obama announced the U.S. would restore diplomatic relations
with Cuba by reopening the U.S. embassy and removing Cuba from
the list of state sponsors of terrorism.204 In May 2015, Cuba was
removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism 205 and the U.S.
embassy in Cuba was re-opened in August 2015.206 Yet none of these
liberalizations overcome the most significant barrier to opening
economic relations: The Helms-Burton Act.
Most recently, President Trump has expanded certain restrictions
on financial transactions with Cuban officials and on travel to Cuba.207
But, there have not been many substantive changes to the current
regulations in place.208

203

DOMINGUEZ & PROVOST, supra note 5, at 129-50. (President Clinton
made some changes before the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, and
President Bush kept some of those changes, but reversed some as well.).
204 See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 72.
205
Id. at 73.
206
Id. at 74.
207 U.S. DEP T OF TREASURY, Treasury, Commerce, and State
Implement Changes to the Cuba Sanctions Rules, (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0209.aspx
(last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
208 Id.
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D. U.S. EVALUATION OF ITS PROPERTY CLAIMS
In 1964, Congress added Title V the Cuban Claims Act209 to the
International Claims Settlement Act 210 to specifically address U.S.
211
After World War II, Congress
enacted the International Claims Settlement Act to establish the
212

The Commission was established to administer and
disburse funds to U.S. citizens who lost their property in specified
foreign countries.213 The Cuban Claims Act established a procedural
mechanism for adjudicating and quantifying claims, but did not
authorize the appropriation of any funds for claim payments. 214
In general, under the International Claims Settlement Act,
Congress directed the Commission to
215
To determine the value of
the claim,
under international law, the Commission shall award the fair
market value of the property as of the time of the taking by the
foreign government involved (without regard to any action or
event that occurs after the taking), except that the value of the
claim shall not reflect any diminution in value attributable to
actions which are carried out, or threats of action which are made,
by the foreign government with respect to the property before the
taking. Fair market value shall be ascertained in accordance with
the method most appropriate to the property taken and equitable
to the claimant, including (i) market value of outstanding equity

209

Cuban Claims Act, supra note 67. (In 1966, Chapter V was also
amended to extend the applicability of its provisions to Communist China.).
210
22 U.S.C. § 1621 (1955).
211 Cuban Claims Act, supra note 67.
212
Id.
213
22 U.S.C. § 1621-1627 (1964).
214 Cuban Claims Act, supra note 67.
215 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a)(2)(B) (2012).
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securities; (ii) replacement value; (iii) going-concern value
(which includes consideration of an enterprise's profitability); and
(iv) book value. 216

The Commission is independent in its findings, and its awards are
ation. 217 As
to the property claims against the Cuban government, the Commission
was directed to:
determine in accordance with applicable substantive law,
including international law, the amount and validity of claims by
nationals of the United States against the Government of
the nationalization, expropriation, intervention, or other taking of,
or special measures directed against, property including any
rights or interests therein owned wholly or partially, directly or
indirectly at the time by nationals of the United States. . . In
making the determination with respect to the validity and amount
of claims and value of properties, rights, or interests taken, the
Commission shall take into account the basis of valuation most
appropriate to the property and equitable to the claimant,
including but not limited to: (i) fair market value, (ii) book value,
(iii) going concern value, or (iv) cost of replacement. 218

As to personal injury or disability claims against the Cuban
government, the Commission was directed to:
determine in accordance with applicable substantive law,
including international law, the amount and validity of claims by
nationals of the United States against the Government of Cuba. .
. arising since January 1, 1959. . . for disability or death resulting

216
217
218

Id. (emphasis added).
22 U.S.C. § 1622g (2012).
22 U.S.C. § 1643b(a) (emphasis added).
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from actions taken by or under the authority of the Government
of Cuba.219

In addition, the Act provides that the Commission must determine
220
to the expropriated property and any offsets to
221
the award.
It is important to note that the Commission was only
authorized to consider claims of U.S. nationals who had title to the
expropriated property at the time of the taking and held it continuously
until filing their claim with the Commission. 222 The Commission did
not have jurisdiction to review any claims to expropriated property for
property owners who were Cuban nationals at the time of the taking. 223
The Commission was set up to apply standards of international
law and determine the validity of the expropriation claims and the
value of the compensation due. 224 The Final Report of the
225
in referring to the language
from the international legal standard that would normally prevail in the
evaluation of nationalized property. It is designated to strengthen that
standard by giving specific bases of valuation that the Commission
226

219
220

Id. § 1643b(b) (emphasis added).
Id.

wholly or partially, directly or indirectly by a national of the United States on
221
222
223

Id. § 1643e.
Id. § 1643c.
Id.; see

or (B) a corporation or other legal entity which is organized under the laws of
224
225
226

22 U.S.C. § 1623 (2012).
See FCSC Cuban Report, supra note 1.
Id. at 137, 142 (stating the specific bases of determining valuation
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The Commission adjudicated a total of 8,816 claims, of which,
5,911 were found to be compensable. 227 The total principal value of
adjudicated claims was $1,851,057,358.00.228 Thereafter, on July 15,
2005,229 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice requested the
Commission conduct a Second Cuban Claims Program to adjudicate
and certify claims that arose after May 1, 1967, which were not
adjudicated by the original Cuban Claims Program. 230
The
Commission received a total of five claims and denied three. 231 Two
claims were certified as valid in principal amounts of $51,128,926.95
and $16,000.00.232

E. CONCLUSION
Throughout the years, the U.S. has adamantly defended the longof international law, including the uncompensated takings of $1.9
billion in American property from 1950-1963, threat of use of force,
and human rights violations. All of these grounds invoke international
law principles.
The Helmsments in Cuba has rallied international
law.233 The next section discusses whether the U.S. embargo against
Cuba violates or is justified by international law.

227

See FCSC Cuban Report, supra note 1.
Id.
229 Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Mr. Tamargo,
(July 15, 2005).
230
Id.
231 FCSC Cuban Report, supra note 1.
232
Id.
233
See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 64th plen. Mtg. at 19-20, U.N.
Doc. A/56/PV.64 (Nov. 27, 2001) (recording the 2001 vote as 167-3-3 in favor
of drafting a resolution for ending the embargo).
228

2017

RESOLVING LEGAL C LAIMS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND C UBA

183

III.
INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDES A FAIR
FRAMEWORK TO RESOLVE THE LEGAL CLAIMS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA
A. INTRODUCTION
The economic claims between the U.S. and Cuba are best
addressed and resolved through established sources of international
law.
The sources of international law include international
234

The primary sources of international law
are international agreements and customary international law. 235 An
the agreement.236
major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary
law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary
237

consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
238
This sense of legal obligation is generally referred to
as opinio juris.239 Over time, international agreements evidencing a

234

Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060 33 U.N.T.S. art. 38 (1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 101, 102(1)(a)-(c)
. . .consists of rules and principles of general
application dealing with the conduct of states and of international
organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their
235

ICJ Statute, supra note 234, at art. 38.
Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 102 cmt. f; See also COLLINS,
supra note 127, at 28.
237
Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 102(4).
238 Id. at § 102(2).
239 Id. at § 102 cmt. c.
236
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widespread pattern of behavior by countries based on the belief the
provisions involved are obligatory may become customary
international law.240 Thus, some multilateral agreements can create
241
This
states generally, is widely accepted, and is not rejected by a significant
242
S
bilateral arrangements on a subject may constitute practice and also
243
Customary international law also arises
from tribunal decisions, since they are applying requirements of
international law.244 Under international law:
If a state by its act or omission breaches an international
If the
consequence of the breach is an injury to another state, the
delinquent state is responsible to make reparation for the breach
to the injured state. Thus, when an internationally wrongful act
occurs, it creates new legal relations between the states
concerned. A state injured by a violation may seek redress by
claims made through diplomatic channels or through a procedure
of dispute settlement to which the states concerned have agreed.
Under some circumstances, the injured state may take measures
of self-help or countermeasures not involving the use of force. 245

International law provides a useful framework to resolve the U.S.
claims against Cuba for uncompensated expropriation of American

240

Id. at § 102 cmt. j. See also COLLINS, supra note 127, at 28.
Id. at § 102 cmt. i.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244 Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past?
Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT L
L. 474, 495 (1991).
245 LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. M URPHY, International Law:
Cases & Materials, 485 (West, 6th ed. 2014).
241
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property.246

185

ty
247

responsible under international law for injury resulting: from a taking
by the state of property of a national of another state that is not for a
public purpose, or is discriminatory, or is not accompanied by
248
International law defines just
sence of exceptional circumstances. . .
an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken and be paid at
the time of the taking, or within a reasonable time thereafter with
interest from the date of the taking, and in form economically usable
249
by the
250

against the U.S. that the embargo is an illegal act of economic
coercion. 251 The U.S. and Cuba are both signatories to or have ratified
international instruments that uphold the international norms on the
prohibition of use of force, 252 the prohibition on intervention into

246

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at §
section sets forth the responsibility of a state under customary international
law for certain economic injury to foreign nationals. . . .A state is responsible
under this section for injury to property and other economic interests of private
247

Id.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712(1).
249
Id.
250
See id. at § 712 cmt. d.
251 See, e.g., Explanatory Memorandum from Ricardo ALARCON de
QUESADA, Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/46/193 (Aug. 19, 1991).
252 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
248

SOUTH C AROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL L AW AND BUSINESS

186

VOL. 14.2

domestic affairs of another state, 253 as well as on the promotion of
development254 and self-determination.255 Whether or not economic
coercion is prohibited under the international legal principle of nonintervention can be determined by evaluating the Organization of
American States (OAS) Charter, 256
Declaration on Friendly Relations,257 and other related U.N. General
Assembly resolutions. 258
Customary international law provides that each state is
responsible to other states for breach of its duties under international
law or agreement and must pay compensation for any damages arising
therefrom. 259

253

See, e.g., id. at para. 7; Organization of American States, Convention
on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, O.A.S.T.S. No. 37, art. 8.
[OAS Charter].
254
See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 55-56; G.A. Res. 217A, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 12, 1948); G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration
on the Right to Development (Dec. 4, 1986) [Declaration on Development].
255 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200[B] (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [ICCPR], art.1 (however, Cuba is not a
party); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200[A] (XXI), at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp.
No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [ICESCR], , art.1 (however, the
U.S. is not a party). Even though the U.S. and Cuba are not concurrent parties
to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, it shows that they both generally find
international law as legitimate as they have entered into their respective
international agreements.
256 OAS Charter, supra note 253, at art. 19.
257 See Declaration on Friendly Relations supra note 68.
258
D G. A. Res. 2131 (XX) Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty (Dec. 21, 1965); G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX),
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 32 (1974).
259
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgement, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 9)
of human life which resulted from them, and that there is a duty. . . to pay
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failure to apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be
260

B. INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK FOR UNITED STATES
LEGAL CLAIMS AGAINST CUBA
resulting from: a taking by the state of the property of a national of
another state that is not for a public purpose, or is discriminatory, or is
261
not accompanied by p
The U.S. has
were arbitrary and discriminatory. 262 An unreasonable distinction in
the expropriation measure suggests the measure is arbitrary and
discriminatory.263 The public purpose requirement, although repeated
throughout all formulations of international law on expropriation of
alien property, is difficult to apply due to its overbreadth.264
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,265 though later overturned,
reflects an instance in which the U.S. argues nationalism is
discriminatory.
authorizing the nationalization of all U.S. property violated
international law, a U.S. District Court held in part that:
[T]he present nationalization measure is contrary to the standards
of international law because of its discriminatory nature. The act

victim state.). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 234,
at § 206 cmt. e.
260
See, e.g., The Factory at Chorzow (Ger. V. Pol.), Judgment 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Chorzow].
261 RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712(1).
262
U.S. DEP T OF STATE supra note 112
discriminatory in that it is specifically limited in its application to the seizure
263
264
265

1960),

RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 cmt. f.
Id. at § 712 cmt. e.
Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp 375 (S.D.N.Y.
, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962),
, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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classifies United States nationals separately from all other
nationals and provides no reasonable basis for such classification.
The decree does not justify the classification on the basis of
conduct of the owners in managing and exploiting their properties
or on the basis of the importance to the security of the state where
ownership of the property resides. The justification is simply
reprisal against another Government. 266

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
decision adding:
[T]he United States did not breach a rule of international law in
deciding, for whatever reason she deemed sufficient, the sources
from which she would buy sugar. We cannot find any established
principles of international jurisprudence that requires a nation to
continue buying commodities from an unfriendly source.
Accordingly it follows that the amendment to the Sugar Act of
1948 did n
law.267

No. 851 likely violated international law because it was discriminatory
and not
ta.268 The
U.S.
validity under international law of a foreign expropriation is beyond
269
However, these lower court decisions
only cases in which U.S.
courts passed on legal questions raised by expropriation of alien
270
On the other hand, scholars have argued that the
subsequent Cuban expropriation measures no longer targeting

266
267
268
269
270

Id. at 385.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 307 F.2d 845, 866 (2d Cir. 1962).
Id.
Rafat, supra note 87, at 50.
Id.
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American properties and expropriating all foreign-owned property
271

It is debatable whether the claims have been undermined, but it is
undisputed that the Cuban expropriations of U.S. property were never
compensated. Thus, the U.S. and Cuba will eventually have to agree
on the appropriate standard of compensation that is due. The
International Settlement Act, the Cuban Claims Act, and the HelmsBurton Act express that full compensation is the applicable
international compensation standard used by the U.S.272
The traditional international law principles on just compensation
for expropriation of alien property date back to European traditions
from the mid-nineteenth century to Word War I, when a majority of
states had constitutions and treaties that permitted direct expropriation
only with compensation. 273 In 1928, the Permanent Court of
International Justice confirmed that just compensation for
expropriation was a customary international law principle in The
Factory at Chorzow case.274
Chorzow invo
expropriation of German-owned industrial property. 275 The Court held
that immunity from confiscation is a principle of international law and
that an uncompensated taking of property is illegal.276 There the Court
famously articulated the appropriate remedy for a taking:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal
act - a principle which seems to be established by international
practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals is
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe-out all the

271

See, e.g., Rafat, supra note 87, at 51-52; Gordon, supra note 8.
See supra Section II.B.
273
See RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 6 (R. Lillich ed., 1983); Edwin
Borchard,
, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 445, 459 (1940).
274
Chorzow, supra note 260, at 21.
275 Id. at 5.
276 Id.
272
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consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible,
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution
in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or
payment in place of it - such are the principles which should serve
to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary
to international law. 277

This passage is important because the Court recognized that the
principle of compensation for expropriation was established by
international state practice and prior decisions of international arbitral
tribunals.278 This text constitutes dicta, however, since the issue before
the Court concerned the interpretation of a treaty and not of customary
international law, 279 Chorzow is commonly cited for the proposition
that under customary international law, the expropriating state is
obligated to provide the alien owner of property full compensation. 280
Numerous decisions handed down between World Wars I and II
followed the Chorzow opinion. 281
The U.S.S.R. and various Latin American governments
challenged the international law principle obligating the expropriating

277

Id. at 47 (emphasis added) (This passage is dicta because the
expropriation in this case fell within the context of a treaty. Nonetheless, the
principle of just compensation for an illegal taking, with the object of making
the aggrieved owner whole, remains a fundamental principle.).
278 Id.
279 Id. at 21 (relating to the Convention Concerning Upper Silesia
entered into Poland and Germany).
280
Id
ich a
281

1936).

See, e.g., Smith v. Compania Urbanizadora del Parque y Playa de
Awards 915, 917-18 (Hale, sole arb., 1929); Shufeldt
sole arb.,
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state to provide full compensation. 282 For example, in 1938, there was
a famous exchange between the Mexican Minister of Foreign
Relations and the United States Secretary of State Hull, in which the
U.S. demanded that Mexico adhere to the international requirement
283

standard.284 In response, the Mexican government asserted that
international law merely required that foreign nationals not be treated
less favorably than its own nationals, at least where the expropriations
285

Widespread opposition to the Hull formula emerged with the rise
of developing and emerging economies after the World War II. 286
Before the war, the opposition was initiated by the U.S.S.R., which
claimed that an alien in the territory of another state acquires property

282

RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n.1.
Id.
284 See, e.g.
The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of
[Country] Concerning The Encouragement And Reciprocal Protection Of
Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered
investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to
283

purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation; (emphasis added) and (d) in
accordance with due process of law ; and Article 5: The compensation
referred to in paragraph 1I shall: (a) be paid without delay; (b) be equivalent
to the fair market value
of the expropriated investment immediately
reflect
any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become
known earlier; and (d) be fully realizable and freely transferable.
285
RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n.1 (citing 3
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 655-61 (1942)).
286 Id.
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solely subject to local law.287 Accordingly, non-capital exporting
countries argued that compensation should be subject to the
interpretation by the expropriating state and that an obligation to
288

Despite the contemporaneous emergence of the rights to selfdetermination and the right to dispose of national resources, 289 the
United Nations General Assembly proclaimed that, even in relation to
natural resources,
Expropriation . . . shall be based on grounds of reasons of public
shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the
rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of
its sovereignty and in accordance with international law.290

U.N. Resolution 1803 affirmed the customary international law
principle that a state has a duty to compensate a foreign national for
solely according to national law. 291 However, the use of the words
well as the prominence of the Hull formula) continued to divide states
on the proper standard of compensation required by international
law.292

287

Id.
Id. at § 712 cmt. j.
289 ICCPR, supra note 255, at art.1; ICESCR, supra note 255, at art. 1.
290
GA Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR 17th Sess. Supp. No. 15, U.N.
Doc. A/5217 (1962) (emphasis added).
291 Id.
292 RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 1, 2.
288
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Moreover, in 1974 the General Assembly adopted the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, 293 which also addressed
expropriation, declaring that each state has a right to expropriate,
in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the
State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State
considers pertinent. In any case where the question of
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under
the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals
[unless otherwise agreed.] 294

This 1974 Charter did not specifically mention international law
or the principle of full compensation for expropriated property.
exchange that less than full compensation was appropriate under
is subject solely to national law.
Not surprisingly,
standard.295 Capital-exporting states continued to promote the full
compensation standard as applicable to arrangements made between
investors and independent governments negotiated on a commercial
basis.296
In the 1970s, international tribunals agreed that the Charter and
views expressing compensation standards other than the traditional

293

GA Res. 3281(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31

(1974).

294

RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 1 (citing GA Res
3281(XXIX), U.N. GAOR 9th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) (emphasis added).
295
RESTATEMENT, supra note 234
States [was] among the dissenters and the other developed Western states
296

Id. at § 712 cmt. j. See also, Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389, 484-89 (1977) (holding that the
traditional rule trumped because the capital exporting states had not assented
to its modification).
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full compensation standard did not reflect international law. 297 In
1977, the arbitrators in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. Libya
expropriation.298

As to the Charter, the arbitrator found that its

abstained or voted against it; 299 as opposed to U.N. Resolution 1803
300

In other words, the Charter reflected the
political will of developing states, but not a change in international
law.301 The TOPC tribunal was not an anomoly. Many international
tribunals, albeit with different words describing the compensation
standard, also asserted
compensation. 302 Notably, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
upheld the same standard. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in

297

RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 2.
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co., at 468-83.
299
Id. at 489.
300 Id. at 491.
301 Id. at 492analyzed as political rather than as a legal declaration concerned with the
ideological strategy of development and, as such, supported by non298

first step to codification and progressive development of internationa
302
See e.g., British Petroleum Exploration Co. v. Libyan Arab
purely extraneous political reasons and was made for purely extraneous
L. Pryor & David L. Schaffer,
Cognitive Skills, Wages, and the Changing U.S. Labor Market, 50 I.L.R. 344,
347 (2000) (following a comprehensive analysis of previous arbitral decisions
on expropriation, the BPEC tribunal held that restutio integrum (restitution or
restoration to the previous condition) was the appropriate remedy under
international law).
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,303
ed
304

However, the claims tribunal

the property taken. 305 In a different case, the same claims tribunal
306

Moreover, before and after the 1974 Charter was adopted, many
of the same states that rejected the traditional formulation of full
compensation entered into a multitude of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) that provided for compensation for expropriation according to
the Hull formulation. 307 BITs are agreements that protect investments
of nationals and companies of one contracting state party in the
territory of the other party. The proliferation of BITs have been
exporting countries considered a continuous erosion of principles of
customary international law through United Nations resolutions, 308

303

4 Iran U.S C.T.R 96, 105, 109 (1983); Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal: Case concerning the American International Group, Inc./American
Life Insurance Company and the Islamic Republic of Iran/Central Insurance
of Iran (Nationalization of Iranian Insurance Company; Compensation for
Equity Interest Held by American Corporation and Wholly-Owned
Subsidiaries of American Corporation), 23 I.L.M. 14 (1984).
304 Iran U.S C.T.R 96, 105, 109 (1983).
305
Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran U.S.
C.T.R. 219, 225 (1984).
306 Phelps Dodge Corp. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 25 I.L.M. 619, 626-27
(1986).
307
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL C HAMBER OF COMMERCE, B ILATERAL
TREATIES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (1977) (listing about 200 treaties
as of the 1980s); see RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712, cmt. c.
308
U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, B ILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, 9 (1988),
developed into a deliberate policy . . . to counteract what some capitalexporting countries considered a continuous erosion of principles of
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such as the 1974 Charter. Indeed, the strongest supporters of the
opposition, Argentina 309 and Mexico entered into treaties with the
U.S., which include the Hull formulation of full compensation. 310
Thus, m
payment of the full value, usually the fair market value. 311 However,
there is no specific formula that provides exactly how the full value of
the expropriated property should be determined. 312 In fact, even the
United States Supreme Court has bee
313

attempted to prescribe a rigid rule for determining just compensation
314
However, there are
sufficient analogous arbitral decisions indicating that the market value

customary international law through United Nations resolutions, such as the
See also Michael R.
Reading, The Bilateral Investment Treaty in Asean: A Comparative Analysis,
42 Duke L.J. 679, 705 (1992).
309 See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Calvo Clause in Latin American
Constitutions and International Law, 33 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 206 (1950)
(stating thIhe Calvo Doctrine provides that an alien may only seek redress for
grievances before local authorities).
310 See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment, No. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., 31 INT L LEG. M AT. 124,
131, art. IV(1)(1992)
expropriated . . . except . . .
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.Leg. Mat. 289, 605, arts. 1110(1)investment . . . except (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory
basis; (c) in accordance with due process . . . and (d) on payment of
compensation. Compensation shall be equivalent to fair market value . . . be
311
312
313

RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 3.
Id.
United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332, 69 S.Ct. 1986, 1090

(1949).

314

United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 122, 70
S.Ct. 547, 549 (1950).
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315

Likewise, compensation should be in a usable form. 316 These terms
coincide with the standards of compensation used by the
Commission.317
According to the Restatement, a state is responsible for a taking
without
318
Thus, under certain exceptional circumstances,
deviation from the traditional standard may be appropriate. 319 The
R
320

Proponents of such a land reform exception distinguish isolated
expropriations from large-scale expropriations, which are carried out
in pursuit of social and economic reform programs. 321 These
scholars322 maintain that in case of large-scale expropriations, the alien
would take into account the resources and paying capacity of the
323
The assumption behind this case for partial
compensation is that strict compliance with the traditional standard of
underdeveloped countries to carry out badly needed economic and

315

RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712, rep. n. 2.
Id.
317 See FCSC Cuban Report, supra note 1.
318
RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712(1), n.3.
319
Id.
320 Id.
321 See Rafat, supra note 87, at 53-54.
322
Id. at 54.
323
Id. See also GORDON, supra note 8
of England wrote that the tuel which requires a state to respect the property of
aliens is qualified where there have been fundamental changes in the political
and economic structures of the state which entailed substantial social reforms
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A TREATISE 318 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1948)).
316
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324

Thus, it would be likely that in such situations,
solutions sought by the expropriating state and the alien property
325

Whether or not sweeping agricultural or other land reform
initiatives resulting in mass expropriations justify a deviation from the
full compensation standard is still a question of international law.326
However, as dictated by the Restatement, this exception is quite
narrow, and is not applicable if:
(i) the property taken had been used in a business enterprise that
was specifically authorized or encouraged by the state; (ii) the
property was an enterprise taken for operation as a going concern
by the state; (iii) the taking program did not apply equally to
nationals of the taking state; or (iv) the taking itself was otherwise
wrongful under Subsection (1)(a) or (b). 327

Accordingly, it is not surprising that as of 1987 no international
arbitral tribunal has applied this exception.328
Arguably, the land reform exception is more of a recognition that
in the settlement of certain expropriation claims, partial payments in
leiu of full compensation is more likely. For example, in INA Corp. v.
Iran, Judge Lagergren, in a separate obiter dictum, endorsed in
principle, a lo
-scale
nationalizations of commercial enterprises of fundamental importance
329
Lagergren construed this standard as
allowing a discount from the full compensation standard by
considering the fi
330
However, no

324
325
326
327
328
329
330

Rafat, supra note 87, at 54.
GORDON, supra note 8, at 114.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 cmt. d.
Id.
Id. at § 712 rep. n. 3.
8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373, 390 (1985).
Id.
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international tribunal has actually applied the exception 331 and no other
Irandictum.332
There have been numerous lump-sum settlements between
expropriating states and the states of alien property owners that have
fallen short of full compensation, but these have not been held as
supporting any modification of customary international law.333 The
settlements are usually driven by political and other economic reasons
and are not due to any exception to the just compensation standard or
other justification under international law.334 The International Court
of Justice has described these partial compensation settlements as sui
generis and proving no guidance under general international
practice.335

331

RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 3.
Charles N. Brower & Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, 491 n. 2326. (1998).
333 RESTATEMENT supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 1. See also GORDON,
supra note 8, at 55and the compensation actually agreed upon is so wide as to warrant the
Examples include:
U.S.-Mexico settlement of 1942, where Mexico paid $24 million for
nationalized oil property valued at $260 million; U.K.-Yugoslavia settlement,
where Yugoslavia paid 4.5 million points for nationalized property valued at
25 million pounds; UK-Egypt settlement for 28.3 million pounds for
expropriated Suez Canal Company valued at 204 million pounds; U.S.Rumania settlement of $24.5 million for measures costing $85 million.).
334 RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 1.
335 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. V. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, 40 (February 5). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875,
inheres in the process of negotiation and compromise; we should no more look
to the outcome of such a process to determine the rights and duties of the
parties in expropriation matters than we look to the results of settlements in
ordinary tort cases or contract cases to determine the rules of damages to be
332
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Significantly, since 1995 Cuba has entered into 40 BITs with both
developed nations and developing nations throughout the world that
remain in force today.336
international law on expropriation and the Hull formulation of
337

The obligations set forth in a BIT only binds the parties to that
particular BIT. However, the Cuban BITs are evidence that the Cuban
for resolution through the application of international law principles,
as it has done with 40 other countries in the past 22 years. 338 The
Cuban BITs also contain most-favored nation clauses (MFN). 339 The

336

United Nations, UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub/Cuba/BITs,
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/52#
iiaInnerMenu (The developed nations include: France, Finland, Portugal,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.).
337
See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of the
Republic of Cuba for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May 11,
1995, art IV, U.K.expropriated . . . in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a
public purpose related to the internal needs of that Party on a nondiscriminatory basis and against prompt, adequate and effective
Republic of Cuba for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Apr. 4,
1997, art. 4, par. 1, Arg.take . . . expropriation measures . . . against investments in its territory
belonging to another Contracting Party, unless those measures are taken for
public utility, on a non-di
measures shall be accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective
338

See UNCTAD, supra note 336.
See, e.g., Treaty between the Republic of Germany and the Republic
of Cuba, art. 3(1)-(2) Nov. 22, 1998: (I) Neither Contracting Party shall in its
territory subject investments or returns of nationals or companies of the other
Contracting Party to treatment less favourable than that which it accords to
investments or returns of its own nationals or companies or to investments or
339
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purpose of MFN provisions is to guarantee that countries treat each
other at least as well as they have treated third parties with which they
have also entered into BITs.340 Thus, in the event that the U.S. and
Cuba enter into an agreement on the expropriation claims and future
investments that also contains an MFN clause, it would bind Cuba to
provide the U.S. the same treatment afforded to the other nations. 341
Accordingly, since Cuba has agreed to the use of MFN clauses which
have bound to the just compensation principle, there is reason to
believe that Cuba would potentially agree that international law is a
against it.
If the Cuban government has any defenses to its failure to
compensate the U.S., they would also be found under international
law.342 For example, the International Law Commission has
considered certain circumstances that may preclude wrongfulness in
expropriation cases, including consent, legitimate countermeasures,
force majeure and fortuitous event, extreme distress, state of necessity,
and self-defense. 343

returns of nationals or companies of any third State. (2) Neither Contracting
Party shall in its territory subject nationals or companies of the other
Contracting Party, as regards their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment
or disposal of their investments, to treatment less favourable than that which
it accords to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or companies of
any third State.
340
Collins, supra note 127, at page 109.
341 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 252 (2010).
342 See 2 Y.B. INT L L. COMM N 106-36 (1979), 2 Y.B. INT L COMM N.
34-62 (1980); 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 284-369 (1979); 35 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 69-135 (1980); see 2 Y.B. INT L L. COMM N 30-34;
35 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 59-69 (1980).
343
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the ILC on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/
texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf&lang=EF.
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comprehensive reforms to ownership and distribution of means of
production in history and was the most significant as relates to
American investors. 344 The reforms did not seem pre-planned, nor
were they communicated prior to the revolution. They were also not
undertaken through one official act or plan. Instead, there were
numerous and complex steps taken in light of political, social and
economic circumstances. Thus, each of the expropriation measures
was different. The initial wave was not discriminatory nor retaliatory;
while, the second wave was, but the third wave was not. . This
complexity makes it even more difficult to determine the validity of
the expropriations and the appropriate compensation scheme. On the
other hand, expropriation claims of foreign nationals have a long
history in international relations and there are well-established
principles in customary international law that states have often used to
resolve their claims. These are exactly the types of claims that the U.S.
and Cuba can take off their diplomatic agenda and turn over to a thirdparty neutral mediator or arbitrator to adjudicate or facilitate a fair
settlement.

C. INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK FOR CUBA S LEGAL CLAIMS
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
The next inquiry that the U.S. and Cuba will encounter is whether
or not the U.S. embargo, in its various forms, has violated international
law. The U.S. initially proclaimed the purpose of the embargo was to
pressure Cuba to compensate U.S. citizens for the taking of their
345

344
345

GORDON, supra note 8, at 108.
See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act, supra note 128.
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346
will in turn determine whe
or
347
under international law and whether it complies with the
doctrines of necessity and proportionality. 348 The international legal
system allows a large scope of retorsions, non-forcible acts of lawful
retaliation, such as the limiting of diplomatic relations. 349 Such
retorsions are legal and are not subject to limitations of necessity and
proportionality.350

On the other hand, reprisals, commonly referred to as
herwise be
contrary to the international obligations of an injured state vis-à-vis the
responsible state, if they were not taken by the former in response to
351
Throughout history

346

BLACK

S

LAW D ICTIONARY

retorsion include suspending diplomatic relations, expelling foreign nationals,
347

BLACK S LAW D ICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014) (
with a long history, and modern writers are not agreed on the meaning which
should be given to it today. Literally and historically it denotes the seizing of
property or persons by way of retaliation. . . Reprisals when they are taken
today are taken by a state, but some writers would still limit the word to acts
of taking or withholding the property of a foreign state or its nationals, for
J.L. BRIERLY, THE L AW OF NATIONS 321
22 (5th ed. 1955)).
348 See David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM.
J. INT L L. 817, 827 (2002). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 234 at §
905(1).
349 See Draft Articles and Commentary on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. INT L L. COMM N 31, 128, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [hereinafter Draft ILC State Responsibility].
350
See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124
YALE L.J
subject to principles of proportionality, necessity, or good faith, the
mainstream view is that any such constraints are not legal but political in
351

ILC State Responsibility, supra note 349, at 128.
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states have relied on countermeasures to enforce international legal
obligations.352 In the last century, countermeasures have been
recognized by the International Court of Justice 353 and international
arbitral tribunals as legitimate under international law.354 Further,
countermeasures also apply in the realm of treaty law as stated in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 355 A material breach of a
terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in
356

Under customary international law countermeasures are restricted
by the doctrines of necessity, and proportionality. 357 Countermeasures
are only allowed in response to a violation of international law 358 and
must be necessary to end a violation of international law, to prevent
further violation international law, or to remedy the violation of
international law. 359 Unless there is an emergency state of necessity,

352

OMER YOUSIF ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-FORCIBLE COUNTERMEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL L AW 6-41 (1988) (tracing their development
from the seventeenth century).
353
See, e.g., Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J.
7 (Sept. 25).
354 See, e.g., Air Serv. Agreement of 27 Mar. 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18
R.I.A.A. 417 (1978) (tribunal approved the United States' cancellation of flight
route, a clear violation of the countries' air service agreement, in response to
France's disruption of its route).
355 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also John Norton Moore,
Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39 Va.
Int'l L. 881 (1999) (discussing the role of nonforcible treaty-based retaliation
in international law more broadly).
356
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60.
357
Report of the International Law Commission, International Law
Commission, 56th Sess., arts. 49, 51-53 , U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts).
358
International Law Commission, Responsibilities for States for
Internationally Wrong Acts, at art. 52 (2001).
359 RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 905(1)(a).
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the country imposing a countermeasure must proceed in good faith by
notifying the other country of the coming countermeasure, requesting
reparations or resumption of its obligations, and offering to
negotiate.360
country, although limited amounts of
escalation may be appropriate. 361 Finally, countermeasures may not
interfere with obligations arising under ongoing dispute settlement
procedures, like the World Trade Organization system, nor may they
disregard principles of diplomatic protection of foreign nationals;
fundamental human rights; the U.N. Charter's restraints on the use of
force; or peremptory norms such as the prohibitions on genocide,
slavery, and torture. 362 Thus, in order to be deemed a countermeasure,
the U.S. embargo against Cuba would have to meet these requirements
to be justified under international law.
The U.S. policy shifts will also influence whether it acted legally
or not. For example, at first the embargo was a countermeasure to
obligate
it to compensate U.S. nationals for expropriated property but was later
justified as a national security measure.363
International law provides a framework for determining whether
economic coercion, such as an embargo, is lawful. The classic
statement by Emmerich Vattel is that customary international law has

360

ILC State Responsibility, supra note 349.
ILC State Responsibility, supra note 349, at art. 51. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 234, at § 905(1)(b). See also Thomas M. Franck, On
Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. INT'L L.
715 (2008) (discussing the central role of proportionality in countermeasures
doctrine and related areas of international law). See also Bederman, supra note
348, at 820.
362
ILC State Responsibility, supra note 349, at art. 50. RESTATEMENT
supra note 234, at § 905 cmts. a & e, n. 6.
363
See Helms-Burton Act supra note 22, at § 6021(14) (finding that
361

armed subversion and terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups
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long permitted nations to conduct trade and economic relations in any
way they see fit:
[I]t is clear that it is for each Nation to decide whether it will carry
on commerce with another or not. If it wishes to allow commerce
with a certain Nation, it has the right to impose such conditions
as it shall think fit; for in permitting another Nation to trade, it
grants the other a right, and everyone is at liberty to attach such
conditions as he places to his voluntary concessions. 364

This is the traditionalist view.
of foreign trade to buttress their claims that the exercise of economic
and political power has traditionally been a matter of national
365
The historically frequent state practice of export
controls and other economic and trade sanctions by many countries in
366
Arguably, there
is no general rule of international law denying states the power to use
export controls for political purposes that could have developed
against the overwhelming weight of such consistent state practice. 367
The first attempts to regulate the use of coercive tactics between
countries through international agreements were aimed only at
regulating military force. 368 The League of Nations Covenant directed

364

EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 41 (Carnegie Instit. Of
Wash. 1916).
365

Charter: The Question of Economic and Political Coercion, 12 V AND. J.
TRANSNAT L L. 101,105 (1979).
366 See, e.g., Ibrahim F.I. Shiata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its
Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT L L. 591, 609-16 (1974).
367
Shiata, supra note 366, at 609-16. See also Smagula, supra note 96.
Richard D. Protosky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A PostCold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five Year Old
Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT L L. 901, 928-929 (1995).
368 League of Nations Covenant, art. 10. The Peace Conference of Paris,
1919, 13 AM. J. INT L L. 159, 169 (1919) [League Covenant].
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369

The Covenant prohibited
states from resorting to war under certain instances. 370 However, the
Covenant did not mention economic or political force as appropriate
measures to resolve international disputes.371 Additionally, the League
founded a number of treaties prohibiting certain forms of aggression
but did not include economic and political coercion. 372 Similarly, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, 373 signed by 63 nations, outlawed all
wars, but made no mention of other forms of non-military pressure
short of the use of force. 374 The 1933 Conventions for the Definition
of Aggression, 375 signed by many nations, including those within the
presumed as aggressive. 376 The only mention of economic or political

369

Id.
Id. arts. 12, 13, & 15.
371 League Covenant, supra note 368, at art. 10.
372 See, e.g., Treaties of Locarno, 54 L.N.T.S. 289 (1925) (The Locarno
Treaties consisted of a group of five different agreements: the main Treaty of
Mutual Guaranty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy
and four treaties on arbitration. Id. The Treaty of Mutual Guaranty or
370

Belgium on the other, mutually undertook that they were not going to attack,
invade, or resort to war with each other, except in cases of self-defense.).
373 Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94
L.N.T.S. 57.
374
Id.
375
Convention for the Definition of Aggression, July 4, 1933. 148
L.N.T.S. 211, reprinted in Secretary General Report 7, U.N. GAOR, Annex
(Agenda Item 54) 34-35, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952) [Aggression Convention].
376
Id. at art. 2. Article II stated that the aggressor was considered the
State which was the first to commit any of the following actions: Declaration
of War upon another State; 2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a
declaration of war, of the territory of another State; 3) Attack by its land, naval
or air forces, without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft
of another State; 4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
5)Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have
invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request
of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power
to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.
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coercion was in Article 3, which stated that no political, military,
economic or other consideration may serve as an excuse or
justification for the aggression referred to in the Convention. 377
By the time of the Nuremberg trials, the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, 378 named aggression as an
international crime.379 The Tribunal did not define aggression, but it
appears from the context of the Charter that the Tribunal only
considered military action. 380
The U.S. and Cuba are parties to the U.N. Charter, 381 which
obligates states to:
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations. 382

The traditionalist view is that the language of article 2(4), as in
predecessor treaties relating to aggression, speaks only of physical or

377

Aggression Convention, supra note 375, at art 3.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547,
E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288 (Aug. 8, 1945).
379
See id. at art. 6. Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter in the pertinent
paragraph states: The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility: (a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common
plan or a conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of
such plan.
380
Id.
381 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
382 Id.
378
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armed force and does not include economic or political compulsion. 383
In support of this view, proponents argue that:
Taking the words in their plain, common-sense meaning, it is
clear that, since the prohibition is of the "use or threat of force,"
they will not apply to economic or political pressure but only to
physical, armed force. 384

travaux prepertoire385 has been
used to demonstrate that article 2(4) was not, at the time that it was
drafted, intended to apply to economic force. 386
Similarly,
traditionalist support this interpretation with evidence that the drafters
of the U.N. Charter considered provisions specifically prohibiting
exercises of economic and political force, but rejected them. 387
Moreover, according to traditionalist scholars, the International Law
armed force by rejecting proposals to expand the definition of
aggression in another convention on the grounds that the article 2(4)
did not justify it.388

383

Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter: The Question of Economic and Political Coercion, 12 V AND. J.
TR NSNAT'L L. 101,103 (1979).
384 Id. at 102 (quoting D. Bowett, SELF -DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 148 (1958)).
385
Travaux preparatoires
materials constituting the
RESTATEMENT, supra note
234, at § 325 Comm. e. The travaux preparatoires serve as an aid in
interpreting the U.N. Charter. The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary 37-38 (1994).
386 Id.; Delanis, supra note 383, at 105-07.
387
Delanis, supra note 383, at 105-06. For example, Brazil and Bolivia,
respectively proposed adding a prohibition on the use or threat of use of
economic force to article 2(4) and including economic measures to the
definition of aggression under article 39. Id.
388
Id. at 107 (citing to Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc.
A/2211 (1952)); Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/7620 (1969).
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However, in the 1960s and 1970s certain scholars disagreed and
should be construed to cover acts of an economic nature by a state
independence. 389 Most Asian, African, and other developing states
agreed as illustrated in the following:
The substantial impairment of goals of the international
community as articulated in the Charter through the deliberate use
of coercion against other states, not counterbalanced by
complementary policies relating to legitimate self-defense or the
sanctioning of U.N. decisions, constitutes a violation of Article 2
(4) as well as of other provisions of the Charter. 390

In light of the political and economic interdependence of states at
that time, there was a legitimate fear that powerful states could
pressures of that kind to the point of
391

Although western states followed the traditional interpretation of 2(4),
they did not exclude the possibility that certain types of economic
coercion might constitute an illegal intervention under article 2(7),392
which states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter.393

389

Paust and Bl

A Threat to
L L. 410, 417 (1974). For a reply to the

AM. J. INT
article, see Shiata, supra note 366.
390 Richard B. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the International Legal
Order.51 INT L AFFAIRS 3, 358-71, 361 (1975) [Lillich II].
391
Lillich II, supra note 390, at 358-71, 361
392 Id.
393 U.N. Charter, art. 2(7) (emphasis added).
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The international legal principle of non-intervention is wellestablished. In 1933, the U.S. and Cuba ratified the Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States, 394 which provides more generally that:
in the internal or external affairs
395

should be settled by recognized pacific methods; 396 and,
of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of . . . measures of
force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive
397
Additionally, in 1948, the U.S. and
398
Cuba ratified the OAS Charter, which provides that:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not
only armed force but also any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements.399

Whereas earlier U.N. Resolutions 400 supported the traditional
interpretation of the use or threat of use of force in the U.N. Charter,
subsequent resolutions focusing on the principle of non-intervention
supported the legal prohibition of economic and political coercion. 401

394

OAS Charter, supra note 253.
Id. at art. 8 (emphasis added).
396 Id. at art. 10.
397
Id. at art. 11 (emphasis added).
398
Id. at art. 15.
399 Id. (emphasis added).
400 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 380 (V), Peace Through Deeds (Nov. 17, 1950);
G.A. Res., 378 (V), (Nov. 17, 1950); G.A. Res., 376 (V), (Oct. 7 1950), 5
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20), U.N.
the Authors of the original text was to state in the broadest terms an absolute
allwas designed to insure that there should be no loophole
U.N.C.I.O. Docs.405 (1945); Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 335.
401 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), (Dec. 21, (1965).
395
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Particularly, three resolutions, adopted in 1965, 402 1970,403 and 1974404
formed the foundation for the argument that economic coercion is
prohibited under the principle of non-intervention. Taken together, the
resolutions reflect a consensus on some prohibition on the use of
economic and political coercion that is specifically aimed at the
subordination of a
exercise of its sovereign rights and the
securing of advantages.
Finally, in 1974, as a part of the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States,405 the General Assembly reiterated an authoritative
condemnation of the use of economic coercion. 406
Thus, perhaps certain types of economic coercion for illegitimate
purposes are illegal, but it is unclear what they are because the terms
407

402

Id
or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from
it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights,or to secure from it
403

Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 68 ([1] states shall
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state; [2] states shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means; [3] states shall not intervene in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state; [4] states have a duty to cooperate with one another
in accordance with the Charter; [5] equal rights and self-determination of
peoples; [6] sovereign equality of states; [7] states shall fulfill in good faith
their obligations under the United Nations Charter).
404
G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), (Dec. 12, 1975).
405
Id.
406 Id
political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to
407

See, ROBERT B. L ILLICH, ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE
EW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER A SECOND LOOK AT SOME FIRST
IMPRESSIONS, IN ECONOMIC C OERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER
prohibitions found in the various U.N. resolutions are pitched on such a high
level of abstraction as to be virtually
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Likewise, similar language in the U.N.
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the OAS Charter, is
equally vague. Thus, the type of economic coercion that is prohibited
by international law, if any, is unclear.
Further, U.N. resolutions are not one of the recognized sources of
international law. 408 General Assembly resolutions were never
intended to be binding. 409 Generally speaking, their weight as
evidence of a possible consensus on customary international law is
inconclusive.410 However, they can contribute to the evolution of
customary international law.411 The legal effect of a resolution as
interpretation of existing or evolving international law is easier to
determine when it passes by a majority of states, is supported by state
practice, and the form and intent of the resolution indicate that it was
meant to interpret or codify existing law. 412 Arguably, the 1970
Declaration would bear the most weight as evidence of, at a minimum,
the progressive development of customary international law.413
However, its vague language does not provide much guidance.

408

Stat. of I.C.J., supra note 234, at 302, art 37.
Delanis, supra note 365, at 115.
410 Some argue that the General Assembly resolutions are mere
recommendations reflecting the political will of the General Assembly and not
customary international law,; especially since the U.N. Charter only grants the
Assembly with the power to recommend. Blaine Sloan, General Assembly
Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later), 58 BRIT. Y.B. INT L L. 39, 52-61
(1988); U.N. Charter, art. 14. However, even those who believe that the
General Assembly resolutions are declaratory and interpretive of existing
international law, agree that the legal effect of the resolutions outside the U.N.
are unclear.
411
See INT L LAW COMM N ILC Sixty-fifth Session, Geneva, 6 May-7
June and 8 July-9 August 2013, First Report on the Formation and Evidence
of Customary International Law of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, May 6-June 7, 2013
and July 8-August 9, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/663 (May 17, 2013).
412
Sloan, supra note 410, at 138.
409

413
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In Nicaragua v. United States, Nicaragua asserted that the United
States violated the principle of non-intervention by ending financial
aid to Nicaragua, cutting the sugar quota by ninety percent, and
imposing a trade embargo. 414 The International Court of Justice held
the economic plane as is here complained of as a break of the
415
customary-law principle of nonThe Court also noted
than it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a treaty commitment or other
416

State practice has not supported a widely recognized international
legal prohibition on the use of economic coercion. 417 Legal
commentators have listed numerous instances of the use of economic
coercion, both pre-1970 Declaration 418 and post-1970 Declaration.419
Nevertheless, the U.S. and Cuba are parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which governs the
1982 Ministerial Declaration, the original GATT 420 contracting parties
of a non-economic character, not consistent with the General

414

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Jun. 27) at paras. 123-25.
415
Id. at para. 275.
416 Id. at para. 276.
417
For example, in 1973 when Arab oil embargo was in force, the
of the Arab
States and Peoples whose territories are under foreign occupation to permanent
supra note 366, at 619.
418
Id. at 609-16.
419
Id. at 625-26. See also GARY C. HUFBAUER JEFFREY J. SCHOTT,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 7 (3d ed. 1985). The United States has
used economic sanctions to negotiate compensation for expropriated property
nine times since WWII. Eight; eight of the nine Cuba being the outlier have
resulted in settlements.
420 GATT, supra note 66.
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421

The original GATT, was a set of provisional rules
under which nations were permitted to act unilaterally to impose trade
restrictions and did so with the power to simply block any adverse
dispute resolution panel decision that might result from their
actions.422 However, since 1994, under the new WTO framework,
unilateral actions in violation of the GATT are subject to its dispute
resolution mechanism.423
For example, the U.S. is obligated under GATT Article I of GATT
equal preference.424
prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges . .
. shall be instituted . . . by any contracting party on the importation of
425
The
U.S. embargo against Cuba, a GATT member state, would violate
these two provisions because it affords Cuba less favorable treatment
than to other member states and places restrictions on imports of
Cuban goods and services. However, Article XX provides a national
security exemption that allows contracting parties to suspend their
tion of its essential
security interests . . taken in time of war or other emergency in
426
Therefore, a contracting party may impose
protectionist trade restrictions that would otherwise violate the GATT
to preserve its national security. Whether or not the U.S. embargo
against Cuba is or was necessary to protect its national security since
1994, is a question of international law. The GATT provides a dispute

421

Ministerial Declaration, L/5424 ( Nov. 29, 1982), GATT B.I.S. (29th
Supp.) at 9, 11 (1983).
422 Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the
Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based
Relations and Establishing A New Balance Between Sovereignty and
Multilateralism, 26 YALE INT'L L. 413, 436 (2001).
423
Id. at 437.
424
GATT, supra note 66, at art. 1I.
425 Id. at art. XI.
426 Id. at art. XX.
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resort to countermeasures to resolve any dispute under the jurisdiction
of the GATT.
Further, the extraterritorial nature of the Helms-Burton Act may
violate the international law principle of territoriality.
The
territoriality principle provides that a state is free to impose laws
governing all events within its jurisdiction but cannot reach outside its
borders to impose its will on those outside its territory. 427 However, a
state may enact laws relating to conduct that is outside of its territory
428
when that co
jurisdiction is reasonable. 429 The reasonableness determination
requires limiting the exercise of jurisdiction so as to minimize conflict
takes place. 430 This is particularly applicable to the far- reaching
provisions of the Helms-Burton Act, creating a cause of action against
alleged trafficking taking place in Cuba by non-American
traffickers.431 Even if the Act is not unreasonable as it relates to Cuba,
its application may conflict with the interests of other countries to

427

OAS Charter, supra note 253, art. 19; See also RESTATEMENT supra
note 234, at § 402.
428
RESTATEMENT, supra note 234
to prescribe law with respect to. . . conduct outside its territory that has or is
429
430
431

Id. at § 403.
Id. at 403 § cmt. g.
Helms-Burton Act supra note 22, at § 6081.
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regulate the trade activities addressed by the Act. 432 Many states have
expressed their dismay with the Act for these reasons.433
D
human rights violations in Cuba, 434 the Cuban government and other
commentators have argued that its impact 435 has exacerbated or
directly contributed to human rights violations.436 Accordingly, any

432

Nicholas Davidson, U.S. Secondary Sanctions: The U.K. And EU
Response, 27 STET. L. REV
by foreign governments as an attempt to extend the United States Cuba
embargo to companies and individuals outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction, and
as such as an unwelcome and objectionable attempt to substitute the foreign
and trade policies of the U.S. Congress for those of foreign sovereign
433

See Andrew J. Rosell, The Future of U.S.-Cuba Relations, A policy
Shirt from the Helms-Burton Act, 7 L. & B US. REV. AM. 235, 241-42 (2001)
(The European Union, Mexico and Canada have enacted retaliatory legislation
that allows their citizens to recover damages against the United States for any
Helms-Burton Act.).
434 Cuban Democracy Act, supra note 130, at § 6002(5); Helms-Burton
Act supra note 22, at § 6021(9).
435 For more on the impact on and development of and human rights,
see Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them:
The Case of the Cuban Embargo, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 199,
235-55 (2007); Benjamin Manchak, Comprehensive Economic Sanctions, the
Right to Development, and Constitutionally Impermissible Violations of
International Law, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 417, 432 -49 (2010); Amnesty
Rights, 15 (2009).
436 Cuba characterizes th

See infra

St. Rep., at 313 (1997) (State Department reported in 1996 that the human
rights conditions worsened.). Human Rights Watch Report 2001: Cuba:
Human Rights Developments (A 2000 Human Rights Watch Report did not
show any improvement in human rights in Cuba.); See also Ashleigh Reif
Kasper, Helping the Helpless: The Foreign Policy Strategies Underlying
Humanitarian Rhetoric in American Refugee Law and Policy, 32 J. NAT'L
ASS 'N. ADMIN. L. J UDICIARY 309, 342 (2012).
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437

argument that the United States may
raise in support of the embargo may be tainted by its counterproductive effect. These Cuban claims of counterproductivity are twoBoth sets of rights are protected by the U.N. Charter, 438 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 439 the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights440 and the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights.441 Specifically, these legal instruments
evidence that economic and social rights are recognized as customary
international law. Further, they also, along with the Declaration on the
Right to Development, 442 evidence an emerging right of a nation to

437

See 22 U.S.C. § 6021(26)Nations Security Council Resolution 940 of July 31, 1994, subsequently
This
law . . . squarely embraces the victims' point of view and interests, rather than
questionable Stateoperates on the following principle: where a state fails to protect its own
citizenry from mass atrocity (i.e., genocide, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against
humanity), the responsibility to protect that citizenry shifts to the international
community. Intervention within this context, thus, is based on a responsibility
to protect rather than on a right to intervene.
Peter Stockburger, The
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Customary International Law, an
Emerging Legal Norm, or Just Wishful Thinking?, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 365, 368exception to the principle of non-intervention for humanitarian purposes
with
438 U.N. Charter, arts. 55-56.
439
G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, (Dec. 12, 1948).
440
See generally, ICCRP, supra note 255.
441 See generally, ICESCR, supra note 255 (Although the United States
has not ratified the ICESCR, it has signed it and is therefore obligated to not
take any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.); Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.18 (1).
442 G.A. Res. 41/128, at 186, (Dec. 4, 1986).
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develop beyond the capacity to only provide its population with the
bare essentials.443
As noted, even otherwise necessary and
proportional countermeasures may not violate fundamental human
rights.444
Finally, despite the vagueness of the effect of the 1970
Declaration, the 1986 ICJ decision, and inconsistent state practice, it
is difficult to ignore over thirty years of U.N. General Assembly
resolutions supported by almost all developing countries pleading for
the end of unilateral economic coercion. From 1983 to 2015, the
General Assembly has engaged in a consistent pattern of issuing
-titled in 1997 as
445

Each resolution has cited
to the 1970 Declaration, and after 1997, has indicated the following
purpose:
[T]o eliminate the use of unilateral coercive economic measures
against developing countries that are not authorized by relevant
organs of the United Nations or are inconsistent with the

443

U.N. Charter, arts. 55-56; ICCPR, supra note 255, at art. 1; ICESCR
supra note 255, at arts.1, 2(1); Declaration on Development, supra note 254,
at art. 8.
444
RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 905 comm. a.
445
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 200 U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 71st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/200 (Dec. 20, 2013) (Yes: 127, No: 2, Abstentions: 50);
G.A. Res. 186, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., 91st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/66/186 (Dec. 22, 2011) (Yes: 122, No: 2, Abstentions: 53); G.A. Res.
54, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 87th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/200 (Jan.
20, 2000) (Yes: 107, No: 3, Abstentions: 46); G.A. Res. 48, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., 86th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/168 (Dec. 21, 19931994) (Yes:
116, No: 32, Abstentions: 16); G.A. Res. 185, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 119th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/185 (Dec. 17, 1985) (Yes: 128, No: 19,
Abstentions: 7) (These resolutions on economic coercion, the latest of which
was adopted in 2014, are not lawconcerning economic coercion in the 1970 Declaration.); see, e.g., G.A. Res.
66/186 (Dec. 22, 2011).

SOUTH C AROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL L AW AND BUSINESS

220

VOL. 14.2

principles of international law as set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations and that contravene the basic principles of the
multilateral trading system. 446

The most recent resolutions include references to the WTO,
suggesting economic coercion violates the GATT. 447 Ironically, the
continued need for such resolutions may support the notion that no
such international law prohibition on economic coercion exists. From
its initial adoption, the resolution voting patterns show a distinct split
between developed and developing countries. 448
In response to the Cuban Democracy Act of 1991, Cuba requested
that the U.S. embargo against Cuba be placed on the General
economic coercion. 449 Cuba claimed that the embargo was aimed at
c order which the
450
The letter focused
on the extraterritorial effect of the embargo, Cuban sovereignty and
the principle of non-intervention.451 Cuba issued a second letter to the
Secretary-General452 stating that U.S. economic coercion violated

446

See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/186 at 2 (Before 1997, the resolutions plea

coercive measures against developing countries. . . as a means of forcibly
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 39/197 at 2.
447
See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/200, supra note 445.
448 See, e.g., United Nations Bibliographic Information System,
available
at
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=
voting&index=.VM&term=ares68200
(The
last
2014
resolution
[U.S. and Israel], Abstentions: 50 [Most Developed Nations], Non-Voting:
449

See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United
Nations to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/46/193 (Aug. 16, 1991).
450
Id. at p. 2.
451
Id. at pp. 2-4.
452 Letter Dated 25 October 1991 from the Charge
Permanent Mission of Cuba for the United Nations Addressed to the
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453

The second letter cited to the 1970
Declaration, the GATT and the OAS Charter. 454
he U.N. General Assembly
economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United
455
The purpose of the resolution was
pliance [with] the purposes and
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, [re]affirming
-intervention in their internal
affairs, and freedom of trade and international navigation . . .
express con
[with] extraterritorial effects [that]
456
The resolution called upon
all member states to refrain from applying laws that did not strictly
comply with the enunciated principles and to urge states to repeal any
laws that conflicted with those principles.457 The first vote, recorded in
November 1992, was fifty-nine in favor, three opposed, and seventyone abstentions (with forty-one not voting).458
Unlike the resolutions on the general legality of economic
coercion, where votes have not shifted over the course of twenty years,
the votes have shifted in favor of ending the U.S. embargo against
Cuba, as the abstaining countries have changed their vote to support
the resolution.459 In 2016, 191 countries voted in favor of ending the

Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 14, at 3-5,
U.N. Doc. A/46/599 (Oct. 25, 1991).
453
Id. at 6.
454 Id. at pp. 5-6.
455 U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 70th plen. mtg., at 88, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/19 (Nov. 24, 1992).
456
Id. (preamble).
457 Id. arts. 1-2.
458
Id
459
See generally, U.N. Doc. A/48/PV.48 (Nov. 3, 1993); U.N. Doc.
A/49/PV.45 (Oct. 26, 1994); U.N. Doc. A/50/PV.48 (Nov. 2, 1995); U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., 57th plen. mtg.,. at 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.57 (Nov.
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U.S. embargo, none opposed, and the United States and Israel
abstained.460 This most recent version of the resolution added the
following:
[1] [S]tatements the Heads of State or Government of Latin
America and the Caribbean at the Summits of the Community
of Latin American and Caribbean States regarding the need to
put an end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo
imposed against Cuba;
progress in the relations between the Governments of Cuba and
the United States of America and, in that context, the visit
of the President of the United States, Mr. Barack Obama, to
Cuba in March 2016; [and [4] the steps taken by the United
States Administration towards modifying some aspects of the
implementation of the embargo, which, although positive, are
still limited in scope. 461

007 report -General462 claims that:
[t]he economic losses to the Cuban people as a result of the United
States economic, commercial and financial embargo against
Cuba, taking into account the depreciation of the dollar against

12, 1996); U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 45th plen. mtg.,. at 17, U.N. Doc.
A/52/PV.45 (Nov. 5, 1997); U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 37th plen. mtg.,. at 20,
U.N. Doc. A/53/PV.37 (Oct. 14, 1998); U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 50th plen.
mtg., at 19, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.50 (Nov. 9, 1999) U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess.,
50th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.50 (Nov.8, 2006); U.N. GAOR, 62nd
Sess., 38th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/62/PV.38 (Oct. 3, 2007); U.N. GAOR,
63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., at 22; U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.27 (Oct. 28, 2009).
460
U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., 32nd plen. mtg., at 31, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/71/5 (Oct. 26, 2016).
461
Id.
462
The Secretary General, Necessity of ending the economic,
commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America
against Cuba, U.N. Doc. A/62/9268/ (Aug. 3, 2007).
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the price of gold on the international market, amounted to
$822,280,000,000. At current prices, over all these years, the
embargo has inflicted losses of more than $130,178,600,000. 463

D. CONCLUSION
Together, the previous two sections demonstrate the United States
and Cuba have relied on and may continue to rely on international law
principles to support their legal claims and defenses. The next section
provides some guidance on how to best utilize these international law
principles through diplomatic and legal mechanisms to resolve claims.

IV. USEFUL PRECEDENT FOR RESOLVING SIMILAR
LEGAL CLAIMS
A. INTRODUCTION
The notion of one country making reparations to another for its
violations of legal obligations is not new. 464 An interesting
development, however, is the proliferation of international
adjudicatory bodies since the end of the Cold War as a result of
globalization and the expansion of free trade. 465 Particularly
significant is the spread of BITs and international arbitral tribunals,
which adjudicate individual and state claims by applying international

463

Id. at 64.
See Howard M. Holtzman, Mass Claims Processes, 13 AM. REV.
INT L ARB. 69, 74 (2002) (proving mass claims processes usefully provide
compensation).
465 See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial
Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT L L. & POL Y 709, 729
(1999); Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and
Tribunals: International Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC Y INT L L.
PROC. 160, 165 (2000).
464
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law.466 Historically, states submitted more traditional legal claims
among states, such as border disputes, to arbitration. 467 Meanwhile
individual mass claims against states were usually settled through
state-to-state negotiations, resulting in lump-sum payments.468
However, the proliferation of BITs and the wide-spread reliance on
international arbitration to resolve expropriation-related claims
provides another legitimate avenue for resolution of those claims.469
The U.S. and Cuba alone have entered into over eighty BITs. 470

466

Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and
Tribunals: International Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC Y INT L L.
PROC. 160-62 (2000).
467 See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between His
Britannick Majesty and the United States of America, by Their President, with
the advice and consent of Their Senate, U.S.-U.K., 19 November 1794
(resolving19 November 1794, U.S.-U.K. (entered into force 29 February
1796). Commonly referred to as the Jay Treaty, the Treaty resolved various
outstanding questions between the United States and the United Kingdom that
arose after the United States declared independence and arbitration was used
to determine part of the boundary between the remaining British possessions
and the United States).
468 Lump sum payments are paid from one government to another and
individual claims are not directly considered. See, e.g., Claims Settlement
Agreement between the United States of America and the Great Socialist
-Libya, Aug. 14, Jamahirirya (2008,
122 Stat. 2999 (demonstrating how lump sum payments are paid from one
government to another and individual claims are not directly considered),
available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/109771.pdf (last
visited April 16, 2017); Claims Settlement Agreement between the United
amahirirya
(2008),
available
at
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
109771.pdf (last visited April 16, 2017); Canada-Cuba Agreement of Nov. 7,
1980, 1981 Can. T.S. No. 18.
469
U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations, B ILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES 31 (1988).
470 Id.
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B. LUMP-SUM PAYMENTS
In the United States, the president has the authority to settle the
-sum
471
payment.
This is known as the
. As applied
to Cuba, this doctrine authorizes the executive branch to bind U.S.
claimants of expropriated property and provide limited remedies in
any settlement agreement with Cuba.472 Under standard practice, U.S.
ernment settlement, and
dissatisfied claimants cannot pursue their claims before U.S. courts or
courts of the settling country. 473 Although the U.S. is not bound to
espouse the claims, the Commission report indicates the U.S.
und by its claims against Cuba.474
Of the forty-three lump-sum claims settlement programs
concluded by the U.S. for its claimants expropriated property claims,
very few provided the U.S. with compensation for the full amount of

471

See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S.Ct. 2972, 2986-87, 453 U.S.
654, 679-81 (1981) (holding that the President has the power to compel the
transfer of property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to which a
foreign country has interest, in the context of a transaction).
472 See id. at 655.
473
See Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 248 (Cl. Ct.
1983) (rejecting t
property by the United States),
, 756 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
474 U.S. 909 (1985).
474
FCSC CUBAN REPORT, supra note 1
are sent to the Secretary of State for use in the future negotiation of a claims
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the certified claims;475 and none paid the full amount of interest.476
Except in the case of Vietnam, none of the post-1975 international
settlement agreements provide for any interest from the date of the
claim accrual or the date of settlement. 477 In the case of Vietnam, the
amount of frozen Vietnamese assets in the U.S. was sufficient to pay
the amount of the certified claims with interest.478 Thus, Vietnam
simply allowed the U.S. to apply those frozen assets to compensate the
claimants.
Most of the agreements have also required the U.S. to return any
assets and property that were frozen. 479 Interestingly, despite the

475

See Shanghai Power Co., 4 Cl. Ct., at 239. See also 2015 FCSC ANN.
Rep. sec. IV, at 32-33. [hereinafter ANN. REP.]
forty percent of the $197 million certified by the FCSC.). See also U.S.
Department of Justice, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 2015 Ann.
Sec.
IV
Table
of
Completed
Programs,
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/page/file/934631/download (last visited April
16, 2017).
476 Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims,
U.S.-F.R.G., May 13, 1992, S.-F.R.G., T.I. A, T.I.A.S. 11959. See Letter from
Ronald J. Bettauer, Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and
Investment Disputes, U.S. Department of State, to claimants (May 29, 1992)
interest at the approximate annual rate of 3% from the time the U.S. properties
were taken); 11959 Department of State, to claimants (May 29, 1992);
Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims, May 13,
1992, U.S.-F.R.G., T.I.A.S. 11959.
477 BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL C LAIMS : THEIR
SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS, 1975-1995, 23 77 (The Procedural
478

Id.
See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Republic of Albania on the Settlement
of Certain Outstanding Claims art. 6, U.S.-Alb., Jan. 11, 1995, Ex. Rept. 104479

inform the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold of its

2017

RESOLVING LEGAL C LAIMS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND C UBA

227

the time the claims accrue, (i.e. the time of the taking of property),
several of the lump-sum agreements have included claims of foreign
nationals, who, since the takings, had become U.S. citizens. 480 Again,
the U.S. is not bound by these previous settlements nor do they provide
state practice in support of a new standard of compensation. 481 Instead,
they indicate how the U.S. is likely to settle its claims with Cuba. 482
In a 1992 agreement between the U.S. and Germany, the German
government agreed to pay up to $190 million, which covered 100% of
the principal and approximately 50% of the interest of U.S. claims.483
This agreement was pertinent in two respects. First, the U.S. accepted
less than the full 6% interest because Germany rejected payment of

readiness to consent to the release to the Government of Albania, in
accordance with the procedures referred to in paragraph 2, of the appropriate
amount of gold under Part III of the Agreement of Reparation of January 14,
480

Id. (The Albanian-US agreement allowed the U.S. government to
nationals are domiciled in the United States currently or for at least half of the
period of time between the taking of their property in Albania and the date [of]
governments settled all claims by U.S. nationals against the Czech
government, allowing claims of persons whose property was expropriated by
the Czech government between 1945 and 1948 and who became U.S. citizens
by 1948 to receive a portion of the lump sum. CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1981, 95 Stat. 1675, Pub. L. No. 97-127 (1981), reprinted
in 21 I.L.M. at 414.
481
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d
negotiation and compromise; we should no more look to the outcome of such
a process to determine the rights and duties of the parties in expropriation
matters than we look to the results of settlements in ordinary tort cases or
482
483

1981.

ANN. R EP., supra note 475.
FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION

OF THE

U.S., 1981
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any interest, as it had in resolving property claims in East Germany
following reunification. 484 Second, the Commission explicitly stated
that interest was to be simple, rather than compound, for the German
claims,in accordance with previous Commission decisions. 485
Cuba has entered into settlement agreements with five foreign
countries for the expropriation of the assets of their respective
nationals in Cuba: France, on March 16, 1967; Switzerland, March 2,
1967; United Kingdom, October 18, 1978; Canada, November 7,
1980; and Spain, January 26, 1988. 486 Although these settlement
agreements were confidential, scholars generally agree that the claims
were settled at a fraction of the assessed value of the expropriated
assets.487 The Spanish claims, for example, were valued at $350
million, but were ultimately settled for about $40 million. 488 Even this
limited amount was not paid until 1994, six years after the claims were
settled and thirty years after the claims accrued. 489 Cuba and Canada
settled the compensation claims in a similar lump sum agreement
where Cuba paid only CAD 875,000 in check installments over several
years.490 These arrangements support the position that due to the state

484

Id.
Id.
486
BURNS H. WESTON ET. AL, supra note 477, at 81.
487
Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the
16 U.
PA. J. INT L B US. L. 217, (1995). See also Michael W. Gordon, The Settlement
of Claims for Expropriated Foreign Private Property Between Cuba and
Foreign Nations Other than the United States, 5 LAW. AM. 457, (1973)
suggest a Cuban
recognition of a right to compensation under either Cuban or international law,
but rather an intention to settle claims as a condition precedent to the
485

488

Ashby, supra note 7, at 421 22.
Id.
490 Id. (citing to Agreement Relating to the Settlement of Canadian
Claims, Can.-Cuba, June 26, 1981, 1981 Can. T.S. No. 18).
489
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, it would be unable to pay the
United States adequate compensation by lump-sum payment.491

C. ARBITRATION
Recently, however, countries have come to settle individual
claims through the growing field of international arbitration tribunals,
which have proven successful in otherwise intractable disputes. 492
Thus, in addition to the traditional diplomatic negotiations and a lumpsum payment, the United States and Cuba could use arbitration to settle
some, or all, of their legal claims governed by international law.
One of the most attractive features of arbitration is that the
proceedings are generally conducted in ad hoc courts of arbitration
specifically designed to deal with a particular dispute. 493 The parties
can participate in defining the issue to be adjudicated, retain the power

491

ompensation to
United States claimants to a fractional amount proportionally equal to or less
than that received by other countries, regardless of the form of compensation.
See Travieso-Diaz , supra note 487, at 217. See also Ambassador Stuart
Eisenstat, Speaking on Cuban Claims, National Public Radio (Jun. 9, 2007)
(settling the thousands of claims pending against Cuba should not be much of
an obstacle to normalization
economic state, any compensation received by claimants may be little more
492

In the Iran-U.S. Tribunal, individual claimants may present their
claims to the Tribunal directly in accordance with Article III (3) of the Claims
within the scope of this Agreement shall be presented to the Tribunal either by
claimants themselves, or in the case of claims less than $250,000, by the
Declaration, 20 ILM 230, art III (1981) [hereinafter Settlement Declaration].
See also United Nations Compensation Commission, UNCC/What We Do,
http://www.uncc.ch/what-we-do (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). See also .EgyptIsrael Arbitration Tribunal: Award in Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba
Area. 27 I.L.M 1421 (1988).
493 See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL L AW : C ASES AND
MATERIALS 788 3rd (3d ed. 1993).
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to select the arbitrators the forum, and designate the rules of procedure
that will be used to settle the dispute. 494 Arbitration also provides the
parties with the option of holding hearings in secret. 495 Thus,
arbitration provides an appealing forum,because it is much more
flexible than a court and allows the parties to maintain more control
over the proceedings.496
For example, in 1981, the Iran-US Tribunal established a General
Declaration to resolve the crisis between the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the United States.497 The crisis commenced in 1979 when Iranian
students held 53 U.S. nationals hostage at the U.S. embassy in Tehran
and escalated when the U.S. froze all Iranian property and assets in the
U.S. and cancelled arms exports to Iran. 498 By 1980, over 400 actions
were filed in the United States against Iran. 499 In January 1981, with
Algeria as an intermediary, Iran and the U.S. resolved the hostage
crisis and the expropriation claims, through two declarations: the
General Declaration 500 and the Claims Settlement Declaration.501
The countries decided how their claims would be decided and by
whom. The Claims Settlement Declaration set up the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal, with jurisdiction to hear three categories of claims: claims of
U.S. nationals against Iran and vice versa;502 official claims of the two

494

Id. at 790-91.
Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and
International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 65, 70 (1998).
496 Id.
497
Iran-United States Tribunal, About the Tribunal, (last visited Feb.
22, 2018), available at https://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/A-About.aspx.
498 CHARLES BOWER, THE LESSONS OF THE IRAN -US C LAIMS TRIBUNAL
APPLIED TO CLAIMS AGAINST IRAQ, IN THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION
COMMISSION 15, 15 (Richard B. Lillich ed. 1995).
499
Id.
500 Algiers Declarations (U.S. v. Iran), Declaration of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (General Declaration, 20
ILM 224, Jan 19, 1981), U.S.-Iran.
501 Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 492, at art II (1).
502 Id.
495
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nations against each other;503 and interpretive disputes relating to the
application of the General Declaration and Claims Settlement
Declaration.504 The Tribunal consists of nine judges,505 with Iran and
the United States appointing three judges each, and the remaining three
judges are chosen by the six appointed judges.506 Each arbitral panel
is created by the President of the Tribunal and consists of three judges:
one Iranian judge, one U.S. judge, and one third-country judge. 507 The
panels decide most individual claims, but the President of the Tribunal
chooses the claims for adjudication by the nine-judge tribunal. 508 The
Tribunal follows the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, and the arbitral
decisions are final and binding. 509
Some unique characteristics of the Tribunals are noteworthy. The
Tribunal was vested with jurisdiction, not only over certain public
international law claims, but also over municipal claims against the
Iranian government. 510 Thus, the international nature of the tribunal
does not limit itself to only applying international law; but parties are
flexible to choose nationals laws that are directly applicable, as well.
Additionally, individual claims against the other country were not
based on their respective go

503

Id. at art II (2).
Id. at art. II (3).
505 Id. at art. III 13(3).
506
Id.
507
Id. (Third country judges have come from Poland, Italy, Finland,
France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and Argentina.). See
also Jessica Bodack, International Law for the Masses, 15 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT L L. 363, 371 (2005).
508
Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 492, at art. III (1).
509 Algiers Declarations (U.S. v. Iran), Rules of Civil Procedure, arts
IX-XII, IV(I) (May 3, 1983), Algiers Declarations (U.S. v. Iran),
http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/5TRIBUNAL%20RULES%20OF%20PROCEDURE.pdf.
510 Id. at art. II (1).
504
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through diplomatic protection. 511 In deciding the 1984 Dual
Nationality case, 512
Algiers Declarations was to resolve a crisis in relations between Iran
and the United States, not to extend diplomatic protection in the
513
Thus, the Claims Settlement Declaration expanded
the universe of claims beyond that contemplated by the customary
international law principles of state responsibility.
The Iran-U.S. Tribunal is not without criticism. However, the
extremely hostile conditions under which it was agreed to may excuse
many of its short-comings and justify its characterization as an overall
success.514 The Tribunal has contributed directly and indirectly to the
settlement of over 3,000 claims and the paying out of over $2 billion
to claimants.515 It helped diffuse the 1979 U.S.-Iran Hostage Crisis
and restore diplomatic relations. The arbitral process employed by the
Tribunal highlights the flexibility and adaptability of the arbitral model
to resolve complex international law disputes between nations with
strained or non-existent diplomatic relations.
Critics warn that the Iran-US Tribunal model is not adaptable to

511

Diplomatic protection is a situation in public international law where
diplomatic action
or international judicial proceedings on h[er] behalf, a State is in reality
asserting its own right, the right to ensure in the person of its nationals respect
-Saldutiskis Railway Case (Est.
Estonia v. Lith.), 1938 P.C.I.J. Lithuania, 1939 PCIJ (ser A/B) No. 76, at 16
(Judgment of Feb. 28, 2016).
512 Islamic Republic of Iran and United States (Case A18) (Dual
Nationality), Dec. 32-A18-FT, 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 251 (1984). Iran asserted
that U.S. nationals who also possess Iranian nationality could not bring claims
against Iran based on customary international law principles dictating that
nations can only espouse claims of their own national against other nations.
513
Id.
514 Bodack, supra note 507, at 372-73.
515 Id. at 374.
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the U.S.-Cuba case. 516 First, the Tribunal continues to drag on, now
for thirty-five years, running up expenses to maintain its nine
arbitrators and staff.517 Further, a more formal mechanism is likely to
he process.518 Finally, the Iran-U.S.
Tribunal has had the advantage of a large amount of funds from Iran,
,
stream of Iranian petroleum earnings, conditions not present in the USCuba case.519

D. CONCLUSION
One issue with any resolution mechanism between the
United States and Cuba, be it a lump-sum agreement or arbitration, is
520

significantly higher than many of the previous claims the United States
has settled through a lump-sum agreement. There is no indication that
the United States will merely accept a symbolic or token amount from
Cuba in resolution of its claims. 521 The Cuban blocked assets in the
United States are insufficient to cover even one-eighth of the total
amount of the claims.
Currently, the United States holds
approximately $250 million of blocked Cuban assets.522 Unlike with
Vietnam, the United States cannot simply unblock the assets and fully
compensate U.S. claimants. Cuba is unlikely to be able to make

516

Richard E. Feinberg, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba:
Transforming Trauma into Opportunity, Latin America Initiative at Brookings
34
(Dec.
2005),
available
at
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/Reconciling-US-Property-Claims-in-CubaFeinberg.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) [Brookings Proposal].
517
Id.
518
Id.
519 Id.
520
Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 28-29.
521
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22, at § 6064 (a)compensation prior to lifting the embargo).
522 See infra note 552.
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substantial deposits into an escrow account as required to fund a
tribunal adjudicating 5,911 claims against Cuba. Thus, any lump-sum
term installment plan.523
Another issue is the lack of urgency. The time is ripe for
continued negotiations with Cuba and a Republican-dominated
Congress can strategically employ hardline tactics with Cuba since
they are in a better position to change the embargo legislation. But
Cuba will be in no hurry to pay sixty-year-old claims without strategic
incentives. U.S. claimants, after waiting sixty years, are not
necessarily inclined to push Congress to make their claims a
priority.524 So unlike the Iran situation, there is no sense of a crisis that
requires urgent resolution. And, unlike Central and Eastern European
countries such as the Czech Republic, there is no democratic change
on the horizon to motivate U.S. investment in Cuba.
The next section will consider these distinguishing qualities while
-Cuba
claims in order to make a new, less modest proposal.

V.
APPLYING PRECEDENT: PROPOSALS FOR
MECHANISMS TO RESOLVE THE LEGAL CLAIMS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA
A. THE TWO MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND CREATIVE PROPOSALS
Much of the literature on U.S. and Cuba claims focus solely on

523

Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 28-29.
See JOAQUIN ROY, CUBA, THE UNITED S TATES, AND THE HELMSBURTON DOCTRINE 17-162 (Univ. Press of Fl. 2000). (stating many of the large
corporations whose properties were taken received substantial compensation
through indirect tax write-offs).
524
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claims.525 Most of these papers limit their proposals to only
compensate the Commission-certified claims, that is, those claimants
who were U.S. nationals at the time of the taking of property and who
filed their claims within the appropriate time periods. 526 Few
proposals include claims of U.S. citizens who were Cuban nationals at
the time of the taking and whose property was confiscated upon their
departure from Cuba.527
528

Other papers have addressed the legality of the Helms Burton Act529
and the destructive impact of the embargo on the Cuban population. 530
But almost none have included or seriously considered resolving
potential claims under international law against the U.S. 531

525

See, e.g., Ashby, supra note 7, at 421 22; Jose Ortiz, The Illegal
Expropriation of Property in Cuba: A Historical and Legal Analysis of The
Takings and a Survey of Restitution Schemes for a Post-Socialist Cuba, 22
LOY. INT L & COMP. L. REV. 321 (2000).
526
See, e.g., Matías F. Travieso-Díaz, Resolving U.S. Expropriation
Claims Against Cuba: A Very Modest Proposal, 22 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 3
(2016) [hereinafter Travieso-Diaz Proposal].
527
But see Kern Alexander et al, Resolving Property Claims in A PostSocialist Cuba, 27 L. & POL Y INT L BUS. 137 157-76 (1995).). Matias F.
Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban
, 16 U. PA. J. INT L BUS. L. 217
(1995).
528
See generally, Alexander, supra note 527; Ortiz, supra note 525.
529 See, e.g., Luisette Gierbolini, The Helms Burton Act: Inconsistency
with International Law and Irrationality at their Maxim, 6 J. TRANSNAT L L.
& POL Y, 289 (1997).
530 See, e.g., Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General
Assembly: A Post-Cold Wat Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the
Thirty-Five Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT L L. 901
(1995).
531 But see, Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of
Promoting Them: The Case of the Cuban Embargo, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 199, 235-55 (2007); Bejamin Manchak, Comprehensive
Economic Sanctions, the Right to Development, and Constitutionally
Impermissible Violations of International Law, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
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The most comprehensive proposal is the 2007 USAID Report on
The Resolution of Outstanding Property Claims Between Cuba and
The United States ( Report ).532 This Report proposes creating a dual-U.S.
Tribunal established by treaty or executive agreement between a new
constituted as an independent chamber of the Cuban national
533
The instruments establishing the Tribunal and the
Special Cuban Court would only allow for property-based claims. The
jurisdiction of the Tribunal would be limited to property claims of U.S.
nationals certified by the Commission. 534 The jurisdiction of the
Special Court would be limited to the property claims of the CubanAmerican exile community. 535
a bilateral treaty or executive agreement between a successor
government to the Castro government and the Court would be an
independent chamber within the Cuban judicial system 536 The
argument for the need of a separate Special Court for
Cuban-American exiles is as follows:
[B]ecause members of this claimant group were nationals of Cuba
when their property was expropriated, international law generally
does not recognize right of recovery. Consequently, a bilateral
system to resolve property claims between this group and the
government of Cuba would not be supported by international law.
Jurisdiction over their claims would reside within the Cuban

417, 432-49 (2010).
heard at all by the U.S. is irrelevant to the high likelihood that they will be
raised.
532
See U.S. AGENCY INT L Dev., et al., Report On The Resolution Of
Outstanding Property Claims Between Cuba & The United States (2007).
533
Id. at 5.
534
Id.
535 Id.
536 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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judiciary. While claims by this group are not supported
specifically by either [U.S.] domestic or international law,
politically and economically their claims should not be
ignored. 537

In the Report, neither the Tribunal nor the Court would have
jurisdiction to hear any government- to- government claims or Cuban
538
The Report recognized that the
claims against the U.S. based on harm flowing from the American
539
But explains that the U.S. should exclude Cuban claims
l
bodies sought to be established here should not be overrun by Cuban
540
Finally, the Report
claims are allowed, making the claim settlement process a two-way
street, only valid property-based claims should be considered under
541

Other noteworthy features of the Report-proposed Tribunal would
one third appointed each by
the governments of Cuba and the U.S. and the remaining third
appointed by agreement among the two thirds who have been
Commission
Finally, a distinction
is made between small claims and medium or large claims:
542

537
538
539
540
541
542

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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Small claims are to be compensated monetarily through a
streamlined process.
Medium and large claims may be
compensated monetarily, by specific restitution (under limited
circumstances), or by alternative remedy awarded by the
Government against which the claim is brought in the form of
development rights, tax credits, rights in Government-owned
property, or other remedies designed to promote foreign
investment if the claimant agrees. Large claims must undergo a
period of mandatory good faith mediation prior to seeking
resolution by the Tribunal. 543

As with most other proposals, the Report assumes the U.S.
property claims will only be resolved in a post-socialist Cuba and that
a post-socialist Cuba will not assert or need to have its claims against
the U.S. adjudicated as well. Ten years after the Report was published,
one year after the thawing of relations between the United States and
Cuba, and several months after the death of Fidel Castro, the
assumption that Cuba will undergo a serious regime change, remains
speculative.544 Thus, many of the problems with the Report are due to
its inapplicability under the circumstances as they exist today.
The Report also assumes that it is necessary to bifurcate the claims
into two separate dispute settlement mechanisms. Even if the U.S. and
Cuban governments agree to apply international law, they are not
obligated to espouse the claims of their nationals and limit them to
principles of diplomatic protection. Instead, as Iran and the U.S. did
in their Claims Settlement Agreement, Cuba and the U.S. can agree to
allow dual citizens to assert their claims against the other government
directly. Further, they can allow municipal law to apply to the dual
citizen cases. Creating two separate agreements and two separate
systems of adjudication for similar claims may not be efficient, may

543

Id.
See generally, id. (It is more likely that Cuba will follow the
Vietnam or China model of a one-party officially socialist state with a market
economic. Thus, more democratic than it is now, but not in the U.S. sense.).
544
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lead to absurd results, and will require more political capital. Finally,
it is also unlikely that Cuban-American exiles will deem any Cuban
Court in Cuba to be fair, independent, or impartial, which will
undermine the effectiveness of this judicial process and the finality of
any judgment.
Despite the possibility that the U.S. and Cuba can decide to have
a tribunal hear the Cubanfor legal and political reasons, the Cuban government is unlikely to
want to address these claims, at least publicly. 545 One such reason
would be that almost all Cubans living in Cuba would have similar
claims against the Cuban government. The U.S. has negotiated lumpsum payment agreements with other nations that settled its dual, and it can do so with Cuba.
Another problem with the Report, is how unlikely it would be that
the Cuban government will allow a tribunal or a national court to
consider U.S. claims against the Cuban government without also
addressing its claims against the U.S. government. The Report is not
only assuming a successor government, but also assumes that the
successor government will relinquish any of the previous
a dubious
assumption.
Moreover, it is also unlikely that if the Cuban government agrees
to utilize a claims
will simply agree
ex parte Commission
valuations of the certified claims. The purpose of a tribunal or a court
will be to independently decide the merits of the claims and the
ex parte
decisions of these issues. The less fair the parties perceive the process,
the less likely they are to accept the adjudication of the claims as
legitimate.

545

See Ley de Reafirmación de la Dignidad y Soberanía (Ley 80), 36
I.L.M 472 (1972).
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The Report does signal an important distinction between small
claims and medium or large claims that should guide any future
proposal for the settlement of the U.S. claims against Cuba. This
distinction was also noted by Matías F. Travieso-Díaz in his paper
546

Travieso-Diaz focuses solely on resolution of the
Commission-certified claims. 547 His paper does not assume that the
settlement of the claims will be with a successor Cuban government;
so it is tailored to the current Cuban government.
After indicating that any settlement must take into account the
fundamental differences in the types of properties548 subject to claims
Travieso-Diaz goes on to propose a
549
four-stage plan.
Stage one involves direct payment from the Cuban
government to all FSCS claimants for all claims of $1.5 million or
less.550 This would provide compensation for all but the 100 highest
valued claims and would fully compensate 5,811 claims with
$164,336,899.00.551 With a $164.3 million lump-sum payment the
Cuban government could compensate a majority of the claimants. One
potential source for these funds, or generally for payment of U.S.
claims are the blocked Cuban assets held by OFAC which total $243
million.552 Travieso-Diaz, like the authors of the Report, recognize

546

See Travieso-Díaz Proposal, supra note 526.
Id. at 3 n. 2.
are
now citizens or permanent residents of the United States; current Cuban
nationals who, whether the claimants are on the island or abroad; and U.S.
nationals who for some reason failed to gain certification of their expropriation
claims under the Cuban
548 Id. at 11, 135 (explaining that different types of remedies will be
available for different types of properties).
549
Id. at 14-20.
550 Id. at 14.
551
Id.
552
Id. at 15 (citing Terrorist Assets Report Calendar Year 2015,
available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/tar2015.pdf (last visited April 18, 2017). (The 2015 Terrorist
547
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that the smaller claims will tend to be for types of property that are less
likely to be available for restitution to the original owners.
Stage two would resolve the remaining 100 larger claims with the
claimants directly negotiating with the Cuban government. 553 At this
stage, the remaining claimants would waive their rights to a lump-sum
and negotiate directly with the Cuban government for more creative
forms of compensation like restitution in kind, investment
opportunities, payment in commodities, or payment in state
obligations.554
The author points to precedent in the U.S. settlement agreement
with Germany, which allowed U.S. nationals to decline their portions
of the lump-sum settlement funds and pursue their claims under
Germany's program for the resolution of the claims arising from East
Germany's expropriations. 555 Potentially, claimants from stage one
could also waive their right to their portion of the settlement funds and
negotiate directly with the Cuban government. 556
If, despite direct negotiations with the Cuban government, claims
remain unsettled, then stage three would have the U.S. and Cuba agree
that these claims be submitted to binding arbitration. 557 Stage three
framework.558 The difficulty, the author points out, would be setting
up an independent source of f

Assets Report shows that there are $243.2 million (as compared to $270
million in 2014) in blocked Cuban funds but that figure excludes the value of
real and tangible property.).
553 Id. at 16.
554 Id. at 15.
555
Id. at 16-21 (citing to Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims, 57 Fed. Reg.
53175, 53176 (November 6, 1992)).
556
Id. at 15 n.55.
557 Id. at 19, 20-21.
558 Id. at 20.
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could be satisfied. 559 Finally, a hypothetical stage four would allow
claimants who opted out of the lump-sum settlement not willing to
submit their claism to arbitration to proceed in a Cuban domestic
claims program.560
The USAID Report and Traviesosize is helpful for resolving U.S. claims against Cuba. In addition to
facilitating payment to most of the claimants, it provides the rest of the
claimants with the opportunity to pursue different types of remedies.
561

are less likely to be recoverable or transferred to their
original owners and less likely to have maintained their value such that
compensation is the better alternative. Larger claims, half of which
are corporate claims, might be better off with more flexible and
alternative remedies.562
However, like the Report, Traviesothe role that the
claim valuations will play in any U.S.procedures as fair. 563 Thus, Cuba might require its own claims
commission to evaluate the smaller certified claims and meet
somewhere in the middle with the U.S. at another valuation or
negotiate some percentage of the claims to pay out that it may deem
fair. Any proposal for a lump-sum settlement of the small claims may
need to
own valuation of the U.S. certified claims
against it. Further, it is unlikely that Cuban negotiators will agree to

559

Id.
Id. at 21.
561 Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 19.
562 Travieso-Díaz Proposal, supra note 526, at 17-20.
563
See, e.g., Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 22counsel to the Cuban government has written that no premium on book value
should be allowed for going-business value, in circumstances in which a
change in government economic policies has resulted in a doubtful earning
capacity for the nationalized entity. . . Going-business value is a very
substantial portion of many of the losses found by the Commission to have
560
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settle the U.S. claims against the Cuban government without
addressing their own claims against the United States.
Both the Report and Traviesothe likelihood that larger claimants, half of which are corporate
claimants, and the Cuban government will come to a settlement
through mediation or informal negotiations without the initiation of
binding arbitration. The R
require large claimants to undergo a period of mandatory good faith
mediation prior to seeking resolution by the Court or the Tribunal.
Similarly, Traviesogovernment and large claimants to negotiate a settlement of the claims
and agree to binding arbitration if they are unsuccessful. Without the
strong incentives provided by participation in the process of binding
arbitration culminating in a binding final judgment, it is unclear that
the parties will be able to come to a settlement. Arbitration would
provide a much needed incentive for the parties to settle, which might
otherwise not exist for the sixty- year-old claims.
Further, if any U.S. claimants are allowed to assert their claims
against the Cuban government directly, they should do so under the
protection of a treaty between the United States and Cuba that, like the
Iran-US Claims Settlement Agreement, defines the scope and legal
framework of the tribunal. In addition to a claims settlement
agreement, if claimants are eligible to elect remedies involving
investment opportunities in Cuba, the U.S. and Cuba will need to enter
into a BIT to protect any potential U.S. investment in Cuba.
Alternative remedies will provide U.S. claimants and the Cuban
government with more creative options for reaching a fair settlement
compensation to all U.S. claimants. However, remedies other than
compensation would require significant changes to U.S. legislation
and essentially a lifting of the embargo. Traviesothat these larger claims be settled last is a prudent a one.

B. A MUCH LESS MODEST PROPOSAL
An agreement between the U.S. and Cuba should aim to resolve:
(1) the Commission-certified claims; (2) Cuban claims against the
U.S.; (3) U.S. claims against Cuba; and (4) the claims of U.S. citizens
who were Cuban nationals at the time of the expropriation. This is a
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much less modest proposal because it involves the claims of the Cuban
government against the United States and the claims of Cuban
Again, whether or not these claims should be heard or not is irrelevant
to the likelihood that they will be raised at the negotiation table.
Additionally, certain political assurances and agreements to
change to legislation must be included in any agreement. The
negotiations should be confidential and take place in a neutral and
convenient setting such as Panama.
-fold. First, claims of U.S. nationals
under $1.5 million can be settled through either a one-time lump-sum
payment or in installments within 3-5 years. As it has done before
with Vietnam, the U.S. can push Cuba to include similar small claims
of U.S. citizens who were Cuban nationals at the times of the property
takings and create a separate fund for those claimants. The amount of
interest that should be applied to small claims should also be
negotiated. The U.S. will likely stand by its certified value of the
claims plus simple interest, but it is unlikely that Cuba will accept the
value without its own evaluation of the claims. Thus, the U.S. should
consider, albeit without dismantling the Cuban Claims program,
allowing Cuba to create its own neutral claims commission or review
body that would provide its own evaluation of the certified claims or
another fair process to decide on the best way to fairly evaluate the
small claims.564
All U.S. small claimants must agree to allow the executive branch
to negotiate their claims and to waive their rights to any other remedy
other than their portion of the negotiated settlement. They would not
have the right to opt out of the settlement so that these payments can

564

Id.
would still provide some useful architecture for facilitating deals in the mutual
interest of the claimant firms and Cuba. It would have the virtues of a
prescribed timeframe and lower expenses. It could also provide some degrees
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be released as soon as Cuba and the U.S. agree on a settlement amount,
if they so choose. This would resolve 5,811 of the 5,911 the
payment of these
claims would signal to the United States that Cuba is willing to
negotiate the rest of the claims in good faith.
Second, the remaining 100 larger certified claims would be
submitted to binding arbitration, the legal framework of which would
be agreed to through a claims settlement agreement and subject to a
BIT.565 The goal of the arbitral tribunal would be to resolve the
outstanding claims between the U.S. and Cuba and to provide flexible
and alternative remedies and damages to make claimants whole.566
The claims settlement agreement would create a claims tribunal
similar to the Iran-U.S. Tribunal and would apply international law to
adjudicate final binding awards, while taking into account lessons
learned from the Iran-U.S. Tribunal and the particular needs of each
claimant on a case-by-case basis.567 Cuba and the United States will
need to commit to deposit in an escrow account an agreed-to amount
of funds to compensate claimants.
One important incentive for Cuba to continue depositing these
its claims under international law against the U.S. This will require
significant potical capital by Cuba to accomplish. The claims
settlement agreement would provide the claims tribunal with
jurisdiction over government to government claims, including over the
interpretation of the claims settlement agreement. Thus, the claims

565

Compare 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 479, with Cuba-UK
BIT, supra note 337
should not be a very difficult undertaking.).
566 Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 32remedy options available to Cuba).
567
Although it would mirror the Iran-US Tribunal, hindsight is 20/20
and the failures of that Tribunal should be taken in to account by: actively
deciding the seat of the arbitration and whether that law will apply instead of
choosing default procedure rules to decide; changing the size of makeup of the
Tribunal t
a five-person tribunal with two from each country, who each choose an
arbitrator from a third country and those two choose the president.
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If no such agreement can be reached,
government to government claims could be resolved through a reliance
on ongoing relations between the two countries, including future trade
and investment concessions and agreements for certain periods of
time. Use of public statements acknowledging some responsibility and
commitment to future relations between the countries might also prove
helpful.
Bringing government to government claims within the
jurisdiction of the tribunal or providing Cuba with trade and
investment inducements, might also induce Cuba to allow the tribunal
to decide the claims of U.S. citizens who were Cuban nationals at the
times of the taking. Another incentive might be to allow the tribunal
to apply municipal law to these claims. The main problem with
compensating this category of claimants, however, is that they would
be competing for limited available resources. Another problem may
be that current Cuban nationals may raise similar expropriation or
related claims and cause internal conflict that the Cuban government
would be unwilling to allow. Therefore, the claims settlement
agreement may need to significantly restrict the remedies available to
these claimants to exclude direct compensation or provide alternative
remedies.568
The third part of the agreement involves diplomacy. The final
agreement must include an agreed upon timeframe to completely lift
the U.S. embargo against Cuba and repeal all Cuban laws and practices

568

More research about the interests of this group of claimants needs to
be done. Emotional ties to their home, as opposed to other claimants might
make them more likely to consider other types of remedies. Although beyond
the scope of this paper, an alternative for over 1 million Cuban-American
exiles could involve a restorative justice approach. A truth commission could
be aimed at the Cuban government taking meaningful responsibility for any
alleged egregious human rights violations, executions, illegal confiscations
etc., during the revolution. At this time, it is extremely unlikely that the Cuban
government would agree to this, especially considering the current state of
human rights on the island. However, this might be a better alternative to the
changes on the island proposed by the CAFC while maintaining some of the
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adverse to U.S. citizens and permanent residents. These changes
should
the overall settlement agreement. For example, one such step can be
-sum payment for the small claims, which would be
required prior to any steps to repeal Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act.
Another option could be that Cuba reverse unnecessary travel
restrictions averse to former Cuban nationals living in the United
States.
The agreement will also have to include some assurances by Cuba
that it will improve its respect for human rights on the island. This
part of the agreement can involve the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights or other agreed upon NGOs to monitor their progress.
Similarly, Cuba will likely request assurances from the United States
to respect Cuban sovereignty and not intervene in its internal political
affairs.
There are a lot of other opportunities available to the United States
and Cuba to expand the value of the settlement beyond resolving
asserted claims. The use of third party facilitators, like the Catholic
Church, have also proven helpful in the past. 569 Neutral allies, like
Algeria or The Netherlands might assist with mediating some of the
processes. Additionally, there are endless sources for dove-tailing,
like bolstering foreign aid and investment in Cuba, leveraging

CONCLUSION
willingness to settle similar claims
in the past shows that they would be likely to enter into a bilateral
settlement agreement as part of a larger bargain to normalize relations.
While the Helms-Burton Act and related sanctions regulations present
a real impediment to such a deal, these laws can be repealed or
amended; and swiftly, with a one-party dominated Congress.
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Jim Yardley & Gaia Pianigiani, Pope Francis Is Credited With a
Crucial Role in U.S.-Cuba Agreement, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/americas/breakthrough-oncuba-highlights-popes-role-as-diplomatic-broker.html.
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and mistrust, no less can be said of its history with Vietnam or China,
with which the U.S. has normalized relations and settled similar
claims. If the United States and Cuba can agree that international law
governs their claims against each other, then they would also be
agreeing to fair processes and mechanisms, such as those suggested by
this paper. The final bargain should account for all of the parties
people living in Cuba. The settlement of the legal claims should fall
within the larger economic and political goals of the United States and
Cuba and remain forward-looking. As articulated in the Brookings
Proposal:
The strategic goals in a massive claims resolution process must
be political: to heal the deep wounds of past conflicts, to lay
foundations for peaceful coexistence and the non-violent
resolution of disputes, to avoid jeopardizing fiscal balances and
crippling debt burdens, to build investor confidence and
international reputation, and to help render the Cuban economy
more open and competitive. These vital goals will not always be
fully convergent with the more traditional, legal objective focused
narrowly on the rights of property claimants. In designing and
implementing solutions, as claimants bang on doors and demand
attention, policy makers should not lose sight of their overriding
purposes. In the interests of both Cuba and the United States, the
twentieth-century trauma of massive property seizures should be
transformed into a twenty-first century economic development
opportunity.570
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Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 44 (emphasis added).

